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INTRODUCTION 
THE ROCKS AND SHOALS. 
Will she shun the rocks and shoals upon which her 
sister made shipwreck and perished? Or will her 
firm hand and strong will lead on in safety the 
rich argosy with which the nation is about to 
entrust her. until with a spreading sail it 
reaches the mid ocean of its prosperity?l 
On November 17. 1558 it appeared that the argosy 
of England had in fact been shipwrecked and the 11 rocks 
and shoals 11 surrounding her greatly reduced the possibility 
that she would ever spread her sails again. At war with 
France, she was both militarily weak and financially 
exhausted. Ravaged by recent years of religious 
persecution she faced the prospect of a rejuvenated 
Catholic church on the continent and Calvinist impatience 
at home. She was threatened by France in Scotland and by 
the impending loss of her only ally in Europe, as France 
and Spain negotiated a marriage agreement. Finally, to 
captain the argosy. she now had a monarch of questionable 
legitimacy and a woman. The situation appeared grim 
indeed. Yet with skillful navigation and the aid of a 
proficient crew. the argosy did emerge, after a voyage 
1 Joseph Stevenson, ed., Great Britain, Public Record 
Office, Calendar of State Pa ers, Forei n Series, of the 
Reign ofElizabeth, Vol. I Washington: Microcard Editions, 
1964), p. lxxv. 
2 
of some twenty years, into that 11 mid ocean of its 
prosperity," and a strong and stable Elizabethan England 
prepared to spread its sails and enter its most glorious 
age. 
* * * 
On ascending the throne, Elizabeth inherited many 
problems, the most pressing of which was a war between 
France and Spain in which Mary, as the wife of the Spanish 
king, had become involved. From the beginning of the reign, 
therefore, the French were considered England's major 
adversary, and relations between these two nations played 
a dominant role in the formation of Elizabethan foreign 
policy. 
Traditionally, England had maintained strong ties 
with the Hapsburg powers, and Mary's marriage to Philip II 
had reduced her almost to the realm of a Spanish dependency. 
Despite a so called "diplomatic revolution" in 1572 which 
saw England and France allied in the Treaty of Blois, 
throughout most of the period from 1558 - 1584 there was 
a marked preference for the Spanish alliance and France 
remained suspect. 
There were good reasons for this. Apart from the 
strong trade connections which bound England to Spain, 
the situation in France and her policy during the early 
years of the reign did little to encourage English 
friendship. In 1558 Henry II was king, but his death the 
3 
following year left France a victim of intrigue and 
strife characterized by religious wars which plagued the 
country for the rest of the century. Three factions 
competed for political ascendancy while Catherine de 
Medici, determined to hold the strings of power for her 
ineffective sons, vacillated. Anglo-French relations, 
therefore, were extremely complicated, since they 
depended upon which of these factions was predominant at 
the French court. They also made manifest a marked distrust 
of France in general, since it was well known that even 
with the pro-English faction supporting an alliance, tts 
opponents were always waiting in the wings intriguing 
with her enemies. 
The most powerful faction at the beginning of this 
period was led by the Duke of Guise. Ultra-Catholic, it 
was the foremost champion of the Counter Reformation 2 
and schemed constantly with the Pope and Philip II for 
the extermination of heresy. The Duke's sister, Mary of 
Lorraine, had married James V of Scotland3 giving the Guise 
family a personal interest in Scottish affairs as well as a 
concern for the well-being of their niece, Mary Stuart. 
The Guises were involved in most of the plots in her favour 
and recognized her as the rightful Queen of England. They 
2G. R. Elton. England Under the Tudors (London: 
Methuen and Company, 1971), p. 278. 
3 Appendix A. 
4 
favoured alliance with Spain and aggressive policy against 
Elizabeth4 who was therfore always watchful of them. 
Their strength was an influential element in determining 
her policy. 
At the other end of the French political spectrum 
were the Huguenots. Zealous Protestants they were led 
initially by Conde and Coligny and ultimately by Henry of 
Navarre.5 They aimed to convert France to Protestantism 
and could usually be depended upon to exert their influence 
in favour of England at the French court. 6 Although 
opposed to Spain and advocating support for the Dutch 
rebels against Philip, they were sufficiently nationalistic 
that they would unite with the Catholics to expel a 
foreign threat. This was clearly shown during the 
religious war of 1562 when Catherine de Medici managed 
to bring about a coalition to expel the English. Elizabeth, 
who had entered the war reluctantly at the request of the 
Huguenots, never forgot their defection, and remained 
wary of their appeals for aid in the future. 
Between these two extremes was a group of 
moderate Catholics represented by the Montmorencis, which 
aimed at a policy of compromise and mutual toleration in 
France. These politigues, as they came to be called, 
4conyers Read, Mr. Secretarl Walsingham and the 
Policy of Queen Elizabeth, Vol. I Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1925), p. 87. 
5
rbid., p. 85. 6 Ibid., p. 86. 
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wanted peace at home but were not averse to diverting 
their more turbulent elements into foreign wars against 
the Hapsburgs.7 
Attempting to balance these factions was 
Catherine de Medici. The widow of Henry II she had four 
sons and was determined to preserve and dominate their 
rule. She was the central figure in French politics 
from 1560 - 1589. Angered at Guise domination of Francis II 
she was prepared to discredit their pro-Spanish foreign 
policy and move toward an English alliance in the early 
1570's. Forced to strengthen the Huguenots to accomplish 
this, however, she soon became alarmed at their increasing 
influence over Charles IX and engineered the atrocities of 
St. Bartholomew's Massacre. 
French friendship, therefore, was a thing to be 
treated with caution. Its major value to Elizabeth was as 
a lever against Spain, but she never fully trusted it. 
and her policy did not depend on it. Even though 
continual civil war rendered France almost impotent in 
the international arena. as Elizabeth turned to solve the 
problems of her reign. her acts were always carried out 
with a watchful eye toward her ancient enemy. 
In 1558, although her situation seemed desperate, 
Elizabeth did have one friend on whom she could depend. 
The old Burgundian alliance had firm roots in trade 
6 
connections, and despite Elizabeth 1 s questionable 
claim to the throne and suspected Protestantism Philip 
was still prepared to protect her. Although apparent 
Franco-Spanish friendship at the Cateau-Cambresis 
negotiations might have made it seem otherwise, given 
a choice of England under Elizabeth or under 
Mary Stuart Philip had no doubts as to whom was 
preferable. A union of France, England and Scotland would 
have been disastrous to Spain, especially in the Netherlands. 8 
Philip was determined to prevent such a catastrophe and 
Elizabeth was reasonably certain that she could rely on 
his support. Eager to disentangle herself from an 
intolerable situation, she was careful not to alienate 
Philip through any immediate anti-Catholic religious 
commitment. 9 Gradually, as she gained in strength, 
however, she needed to rely less and less on her Spanish 
patron. Throughout the years until the 1580 1 s a slow 
deterioration of this friendship can be traced. By 
manipulating the age-old Hapsburg-Valois rivalry 
Elizabeth was eventually able to pursue an independent 
course based on neither French nor Spanish amity but on 
England's national interest. 10 
8conyers Read. Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen 
Elizabeth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 164-165. 
9c.S.P. Foreign Series, Vol. II, p. xxii. 
10 f R. B. Wernham. Be ore the Armada, the Growth of 
English Foreign Policy: 1485-1588 (London: The Trinity 
Press, 1966), p. 241. 
7 
The demise of Anglo-Spanish friendship and the 
consequent increase in English independence was 
certainly succoured by the religious situation. The mid-
sixteenth century saw Europe divided into two antagonistic 
and irreconcilable camps. Calvinism had appeared in the 
forefront of militant Protestantism with an international 
character never acquired by Lutheranism. 11 The 
Catholics, meanwhile, emerged from the Council of Trent 
equally inflexible and determined to launch an assault 
on their religious enemies. 12 Each group, fearing a 
league or conspiracy from the other, resolved to work 
through secular powers wherever possible to thwart its 
adversary. 
Under these circumstances Elizabeth's position was 
extremely awkward. Hailed as their champion by 
Protestants and considered an enemy and usurper by 
Catholics she was forced to tread very carefully. While 
the negotiations were sti11 in progress at Cateau-
Cambresis she was not anxious to disclose her religious 
policy for fear of alienating Philip. His impending 
marriage to Elizabeth of Valois had reinforced the fears 
of a Catholic league 13 and Elizabeth was compelled to 
11 rbid., p. 242. 
12 R. B. Wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation and 
Price Revolution, Vol. III of New Cambridge Modern History 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1968), p. 156. 
13Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 33. 
8 
restrain impatient Puritans in her parliament. The 
treaty concluded, however, and her seat on the throne 
of England ever more secure, she gradually allowed her 
religious settlement to unfold. 
Even before her course was officially determined 
exiles from the Marian persecution had flowed back into 
14 England. ~ From the beginning, therefore, she was faced 
with a strong Puritan element in parliament which was 
l 5 determined to place her firmly in the Protestant camp. 
Not eager to precipitate a Catholic crusade from Europe 
or alienate loyal English Catholics Elizabeth remained 
cautious, and her religious policy normally depended upon 
the international situation. 
By 1559 she was prepared to yield to the Commons 
allowing passage of the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity. 
Although not as radical as some would have liked, these 
laws asserted England's independence of Rome and restored 
the Edwardian Prayer Book of 1552. 16 Apart from a 
watchful observation of English Catholics, however, she 
was not willing to initiate any form of persecution in 
the hope that her settlement would be broad enough to 
encourage their compliance. In international affairs 
Elizabeth was continually subjected to appeals for aid 
14Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy 
(Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, Inc., 1964), p. 166. 
1 5 Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 266. 
16 Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 246. 
9 
from Huguenots in France and Protestants in Scotland and 
the Netherlands. But despite pressure from her council, 
she was loathe to repeat the errors of her French 
campaign and, after 1564, confined herself to 
underhand efforts to maintain the Protestant cause in 
these areas. She was determined not to commit herself 
to any official interference which might encourage an 
anti-English crusade by Catholics. 17 
By 1570 it appeared that her policy had been 
largely successful and that most Englishmen were by now 
Anglicans. Elizabeth was reasonably certain that a 
foreign invasion would be necessary to restore 
Catholicism, and the lack of adequate support for the 
Northern Rebellion convinced her that most remaining 
18 
English Catholics were too nation~listdc to support~one. 
Since both France and Spain were by now hampered by 
insurrection it was also unlikely that they could mount 
such an invasion. 
Her moderation, however, was destined to destruction 
by fanaticism from both sides. In 1570 Pope Pius V issued 
his Bull of excommunication tantamount to a declaration 
1 9 
of war against Elizabeth. The Papacy now embarked on 
1 7 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 273. 
18 
Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 337. 
19 Ibid., p. 339. 
l 0 
a campaign aimed to oust the heretic. Making use of 
anarchy in Ireland, unrest in Scotland, Mary Stuart's 
imprisonment, and any other available opportunities, a 
series of plots was launched designed to restore 
Catholicism in England. In addition, after the founding 
of Douai in 156820 a flood of Jesuit missionaries 
poured into the country to re-awaken the English 
Catholics and recruit them for this cause. 
The listless Catholics, ignored for so long by 
international forces, were now faced with a decision. 
Absolved from their obedience to their monarch they could 
no longer slumber behind the facade of nationalism. 
Suspicion of their involvement in the various plots 
against Elizabeth had sparked a new wave of Puritan 
agitation in the Commons. Elizabeth was forced eventually 
to give in. Faced with the threat of revived Catholicism 
she could not afford to alienate her Protestant allies. 21 
Fines for recusants were increased in 1571 and again in 
the 1580's. 22 Although she still preferred a milder 
policy toward Catholics at home, those entering from the 
continent were often apprehended as traitors. 23 
20 Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 305. 
21 conyers Read, The Tudors: Personalities and 
Practical Politics in Sixteenth Century England (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1937), p. 195. 
22 Read, l~alsingham, Vol. II, p. 286. 
23Ibid., p. 272. 
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Catholic plots from abroad were invariably 
supported by the Guise faction in France and often by 
Philip's governors in the Netherlands. Philip, himself, 
normally maintained a passive role. As more and more 
Catholics were executed in England, however, his 
hostility increased, and Elizabeth's assurances that 
they were condemned for purely political reasons did not 
convince him. 24 With Mendoza's expulsion in 1584 Anglo-
Spanish relations were severed. Religion had served to 
estrange natural allies, 25 and as Elizabeth became more 
openly involved in the Netherlands, a total breach was 
imminent. 
By the 1580 1 s the economic foundations of 
the Anglo-Spanish alliance had also been eroded. The 
basis of this friendship had always been trade and 
English foreign policy was normally concerned with 
fostering and preserving this traffic. 26 Traditionally, 
most of England's export trade was conducted through 
Antwerp in the Spanish Netherlands and was therefore 
dependent upon Spanish goodwill. During the 1560 1 s, 
however, when rebellion in the Netherlands brought 
continued instability to this area, English merchants 
were forced to expand their field of commerce. 
24 Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 307. 
25 wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation, p. 159. 
26 wernham, Before the Armada, p. 281. 
12 
For the next two decades trade was extended 
into the Baltic and Mediterranean areas while John Hawkins 
embarked on buccaneering ventures. The use of English ships 
was also increased, and they were· transporting almost all 
products by the end of Elizabeth's reign. 27 No longer 
dependent, therefore, upon Antwerp as a market for her 
exports, nor on Hanse merchants to provide much needed 
naval stores from the Baltic, Elizabeth's foreign policy 
need not necessarily be channelled toward the Spanish 
alliance. Furthermore, Hawkins' intrusions into the 
Spanish slave trade 28 and England's contacts with the 
hated Turks in the Mediterranean 29 provided little 
comfort for Philip's growing anxieties about Elizabeth's 
independent policies. 
As English merchants ventured farther afield in 
English ships Elizabeth reaped a dual benefit. Added to 
increased economic independence was a much-needed 
amelioration of English sea power. 30 The military forces 
which Elizabeth inherited from her sister were enfeebled 
from years of neglect. 31 Faced with heavy debts which 
were increased by her Scottish campaign of 1559 - 1560 
27 Read, The Tudors, p. 239. 
28wernham, Before the Armada, p. 287. 
29 rbid., p. 347. 
30ibid., p. 348. 
31 Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 276. 
l 3 
ar.d French expedition of 1562, 32 Elizabeth was unable 
to establish any consistent program of improvement at 
the outset of her reign. Through peace abroad and 
economy at home, however, she was able to restore her 
financial credit33 and, in the 1570's, was ready to 
refurbish her forces. 
In 1569 Hawkins had become Cecil's professional 
advisor and together they tackled the task of reconstructing 
34 the navy. By improving the design of new ships and 
modifying the older ones, their quality and fighting 
power was greatly enhanced. New ships were longer and 
narrower allowing more manoeuvrability at sea. They 
were also more heavily gunned to create a formidable 
fighting force. 35 Although the actual number of ships 
did not increase greatly 36 the small nucleus of the 
Royal Navy was supplemented by the formation of the 
32According to Sir John Neale in Elizabeth I: 
A Biograph~ Elizabeth's debts amounted to aboutL650,000 
by 1564. In addition, he estimates that the Northern 
Rebellion would cost her £93,000 and the Irish rebellions 
of the 1570's about f500,000. · 
33 weale places the total annual income of the crown 
at approximately l250,000. Wernham explains that by reducing 
expenditures Elizabeth was able to liquidate her debts by 
1575 while still keeping taxation low. By 1584 a £300,000 
reserve had been accrued. 
34Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 355. 
35 Wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 342-343. 
36 
Wernham places the actual number of Royal ships 
at twenty-two in 1578 and twenty-five in 1587. 
14 
Royal Naval Reserve. The widening field of English 
commerce had trained a new breed of seamen on voyages to 
distant lands and merchant ships and private vessels 
37 
comprised the bulk of England's navy. 
There was much domestic opposition toward any 
large scale organization of land forces and their training 
and recruitment remained the responsibility of the counties. 38 
English military forces had traditionally been 11 sparingly 
used at critical points and crucial moments. 1139 It was 
the navy, therefore, that was Elizabeth's first line of 
defence. With its increased efficiency under Hawkins, who 
was promoted to treasurer in 1578, it had become a force 
capable of defending England from invasion, cutting 
Spanish communications with the Netherlands, and 
40 harrying Spain's Atlantic fleet. When war eventually 
came, it was able to take on and defeat the greatest 
power of the day. 41 
* * * 
Whether queen or minister was responsible for 
the great successes of the reign is not at present 
a question we can answer, those who should know 
come to different conclusions, .... As a team they 
37 Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 353. 
38 Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 341. 
39I "d 24 40 bi ·, P· · Ibid., p. 343. 
41 Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 295. 
15 
were superb, matching caution for caution, 
diplomatic finesse for administrative ability, and 
a marvellous capacity for keeping six balls in the 
air at once for an equal skill i2 keeping a dozen 
strings from getting entangled. 
Three days after Elizabeth's accession Cecil was 
appointed her principal secretary and one of history's 
most remarkable partnerships was thus established. 
Elevated to Lord Burghley in 1571, he remained her 
chief advisor until his death in 1598. Despite many 
differences, Cecil and Elizabeth complemented each 
other in a way exactly suited to the exploitation of 
many difficult situations which had resulted from 
43 
several years of bad government. 
Elizabeth's position naturally made her more 
hesitant. She was the judge while Cecil was the advocate. 44 
Yet Cecil was consistently judicial in presenting his 
policy, always stating the case from both sides. In 
August, 1559, in a memorandum on the Scottish situation, 
even though he favoured aiding the Scots, he presented the 
case against it: to aid rebels was against God's law• it was 
dangerous; and could possibly unite Spain, France, Rome and 
the Emperor against England and Scotland. 45 
42 Ibid., p. 263. 
43 Ibid. 
44
sir John Neale, Queen Elizabeth I: A Biography 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Ltd., 1934), 
p. 94. 
45 Read, Cecil. p. 149. 
16 
Cecil was decisive in his policy and never 
wavered from his purpose, but was always flexible in his 
th d f tt · · "t 46 El. b h b t me o s o a ain1ng 1 . 1za et , y con rast, was 
persistently dilator~ to everyone's exasperation, and changed 
her mind frequently. 47 She preferred to rely on her skill 
in secret diplomacy while preserving an impression of good 
behaviour so as not to violate any treaties. 48 Indeed 
she had ample reason to follow this course, for her 
genius had been abundantly tested during her sister's 
reign and she had every right to be confident in her ability. 
Cecil, however, showed no lack of equal ability 
in convincing Elizabeth. By attempting to tone down 
religious zeal in Scotland and the Netherlands he 
presented issues in the realm of secular politics. By 
using representatives abroad methodically to inform 
Elizabeth of every hostile act, especially the French 
use of her arms and style which was a particularly 
sensitive matter, 49 he was usually able to influence her 
more than anyone else. 
Indeed, Elizabeth did not lack able ministers, and 
the debates which issued forth from the Privy Council 
46Ibid., p. 192. 
47 Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 262. 
48Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 89. 
49
wallace MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan 
Regime (Princeton: University Press, 1968), p. 75. 
17 
throughout her reign are evidence that policies were 
often keenly contested. The final decisions, however, 
rested with the Queen. Fluent in several languages she 
was able to communicate with ambassadors and her 
knowledge of foreign affairs was extensive. 50 Despite 
consistent pressure from Walsingham, who became her 
secretary in 1571, Elizabeth did not become embroiled in 
any major Protestant crusade. Although her councillors 
and Parliament continually tried to arrange her marriage, 
she emerged unwed and free from entangling alliances. 
The promptitude with which she assumed the 
government of the realm when its fortunes were 
most critical, the firmness with which she 
overcame the difficulties of her position, the 
skill with which she held her course, through 
the tangled and conflicting interests of 
European diplomacy, all show her to have been 
possessed, even at the commencement of her rs1gn, 
of a rare capacity and an undaunted courage. 
The keystone of Elizabeth's success has been 
described as her policy of "making fires in her neighbours' 
houses."52 
Covert interference in the affairs of foreign 
states for the purpose of exciting internal 
disturbances .... a state, agitated and hampered 
at home, would have neither the power nor the 
inclination to be troublesome to its neighbours.5 3 
50wernham, Before the Armada, p. 236. 
5lc.s.P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. viii. 
52 Read, Cecil, p. 152. 
53 
C.S.P. Foreign Series, Vol. IV, p. vii. 
18 
Elizabeth needed peace at home in order to cure domestic 
ills. To achieve this she needed to ensure that neither 
of her potential European antagonists be given the 
opportunity to interfere. France appeared to offer the 
major threat and she concentrated on thwarting French 
designs. Apart from allowing unofficial aid to the 
Huguenots in France, she focused on two main areas. 
She was determined that France should not exploit 
England's back door through Scotland and she was 
equally resolved that they should not increase their 
strength through annexation of the Netherlands. The 
revolt in the Netherlands, however, could also be 
utilized to divert hostile Catholic elements and 
prevent their assault on England. Her skillful 
manipulation of events in these two areas enabled her 
to maintain the peace necessary for England's 
rehabilitation. 
19 
SGOTLA.ND 
CHAPTER ONE 
BEING MADE ONE BY AMITY. 
Let the two nations, marked out for union by 
Providence, language, and geography, come together 
as equals under the old indifferent name of Britons, 
'in one empire of Great Britain. Then the Scots and 
the English, being made one by amity, ... having the 
sea for a wall, mutual love for garrison, and God 
for defence, should make so noble and well-agreeing 
a monarchy that neither in peace we may be ashamed 
nor in war afraid of any worldly or foreign power. •l 
Somerset's proclamation to the Scottish people 
made little impression in the light of his and his 
predecessor's policy toward them. Although Henry VIII 
had realized that control of Scotland was crucial for 
England's security, the bullying tactics he had used 
toward the Scots had served only to alienate them. 
Henry's efforts to create an alliance by marrying Mary, 
infant Queen of Scots after her father's death in 1542, 
to his son, Edward, had met with disaster. After England's 
unpopular invasion and occupation of Scotland in the 1540 1 s 
Mary had been hurried off to France where she would 
subsequently be married to the Dauphin, Francis. 
By 1558, therefore, England's security was 
certainly threatened. Scotland could link the 
discontents of the north with those of Ireland, while 
1wernham, Before the Armada, p. 172. 
20 
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leaving England open to invasion. 2 On November 17, 1558, 
Cecil wrote the following memorandum of important matters 
to be considered at Elizabeth's accession: 
To make a stay of passages to all the ports until 
a certain day, and to consider the safety of all 
places dangerous in this realm towargs France and 
Scotland, especially in this change. 
Since England and France were already at war he suspected 
that Henry II might be preparing to take advantage of this 
back door~ and his position seemed ominously strong. The 
Catholic sovereign of England had died and her 11 illegitimate 11 
half-sister had claimed the throne. By a coincidence showing 
remarkable forethought, France not only had custody of the 
11 rightful heir" but had also succeeded in arranging her 
marriage to the Dauphin. Scotland was practically a 
French province and surely the "most Catholic king of 
Spain" would not prevent a French invasion from Scotland 
in order to replace one of questionable faith and birth 
with the rightful heir to the English throne, one of the 
true religion, Mary Stuart. 
These were the complicating factors which plagued 
the negotiations at Gateau Cambresis, darkening them 
with a shadow of mutual distrust, rancour and 
unfulfilled hopes. 4 Peace discussions had begun between 
(2nd 
2 Ibid., p. 149. 
3 C.S.P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. 1. 
4J. B. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth: 1558-1603 
ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 38. 
22 
France and Spain in August 1558 and England had joined 
in September. For Spain, a solid French domain 
consisting of France, England, Scotland and Ireland 
would have been disastrous to communications with the 
Netherlands, and Philip hoped that the new Queen would 
continue to follow his lead in the negotiations. 5 The 
French set about trying to split England and Spain, 
using the Pope's influence in an attempt to assure the 
Catholic succession. 6 The beginning of Elizabeth's 
reign had coincided with Mary's marriage to Francis and 
the ascendancy of the Guise faction in France, leading 
to renewed efforts to solidify their control over 
Scotland with the hope of claiming her throne. 
On 18th November 1558, the English commissioners 
at the peace negotiations wrote to the Privy Council 
emphasizing the French threat to 11 annoy England by 
7 Scotland which now is ruled much by France." It was 
feared that if France attained peace she would 
concentrate her efforts on Scotland and her intentions 
with the Scottish marriage were well-known. England, 
however, could hardly afford to continue fighting, 
especially since it appeared that France and Spain 
were rapidly solving their differences and if this 
5 Read, Cecil, p. 124. 
6 Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 38. 
7 C.S.P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. 3. 
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could be achieved the Anglo-Spanish alliance might cease. 
On 20th November 1558, Sir John Mason, a statesman 
and diplomat experienced in Anglo-French relations, wrote 
to Cecil recommending conclusion of a peace, "neither by 
such agreement as we desire, yet by ... , such as we can 
get. 118 Elizabeth, however, preferred to gamble on 
traditional rivalries. As long as she dared she played 
France and Spain against one another hoping to lengthen 
the negotiations in order to gain the maximum benefit, 
or minimum disgrace for England. On 23rd November new 
instructions were sent to the commissioners. They were 
commanded to stand firm on Calais at all costs but could 
use their discretion on other matters. They were also 
encouraged to keep Philip informed and elicit his support 
over Calais. 9 The same day an embassy was sent to Spain 
to remind Philip of the importance of Calais to his 
communications with the Netherlands. 10 
At the end of November a two-month ceasefire was 
agreed upon while the conference adjourned until 
January. With its resumption the English commissioners 
had the following instructions: to conclude peace if 
possible; to maintain the amity between England and the 
Burgundians; to try to ascertain the final purpose of 
France; to keep Philip informed as expedient; and to hold 
8 Ibid., p. 6. 
lUibid., p. 11. 
9 I bi d . , p . 10 . 
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out for Calais. Should the French prove stubborn in the 
last point they were to stall negotiations for further 
consultation with the Queen. 11 English intelligence 
meanwhile reported French efforts to recruit German 
mercenaries which, it was presumed, were to be used in 
an invasion of England from Scotland .. Alarmed at this 
news the ministers advised confirmation of England's 
earlier treaties with Spain for greater security. 12 
It is clearly seen that the conference at 
Gateau Cambr~sis although ostensibly to make peace 
between France and Spain, had become a theatre in which 
the connection between France and Scotland and its 
potential danger to England played a key role. The 
success or failure of this role revolved, for the time 
being, on a piece of territory controlling the southern 
bank of the Straits of Dover, vital to Spanish, French 
and English policy. From the English point of view, they 
had controlled Calais for two hundred years with much 
pride and national sentiment. 13 It had been a common 
practice in peace treaties to return land captured in the 
war and since the French could show no reasonable cause 
why this should not continue, Calais should be restored. 
This was especially true since it was not Elizabeth who 
11 Ibid., p. 109. 12 Ib1'd., 83 84 pp. - . 
l 3 Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 35. 
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had lost it, nor even she who had begun the war. 14 To the 
French, however, Calais was part of the ancient patrimony 
of France which had been removed by force and she had 
simply taken it back by force in a legitimate war and 
with the support of the French Estates. 15 
It was obvious to Cecil, and surely to Elizabeth, 
that restoration of Calais was not only unlikely, but 
impractical . 16 The deadlock, however, was successful in 
prolonging the negotiations and enabled Elizabeth to 
prove that she held the national honour in high esteem, 
thus enhancing her popularity at home.17 Reluctantly 
resigning herself to a compromise over Calais, she 
eventually moved on to more pertinent matters, 
encouraging her commissioners next to have Scotland 
included in the peace treaty. 18 The Scots had been 
making overtures to England for peace negotiations and 
if these could be included in the Treaty of Cateau 
Cambr~sis, any attempted invasion by France via Scotland 
would be a violation of that treaty, binding not only 
England and Scotland but also France and Spain. 
p. 86. 
On 2nd April 1559 the treaties between England 
14c. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. 126. 
15 Ibid., p. 127. 
16MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, 
17s1ack, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 36. 
18c. s. P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. 150. 
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and Scotland, and England and France became final. There 
was to be peace amidst these three countries, none of 
whom was to invade the territory or assist the enemies 
of another. Calais was to be ceded to France for eight 
years after which it would be either restored to England 
or compensated for with a forfeit. For the duration of 
this period, France, England and Scotlan~ were pledged 
to make no -hostile acts against one another. 19 
The loss of Calais closed England's door to the 
continent and left France free to pursue her Scottish 
ambitions. 20 However, Elizabeth could reasonably assume 
that Henry II would not immediately risk a new conflict 
with Spain by attacking England. Although Elizabeth had 
avoided total dependency on either France or Spain, 
Philip was not likely to forget that the alternative to 
21 
an independent Elizabeth was a French Mary Stuart. The 
conflict was still far from over. The treaty had left 
France surrounded by Hapsburg territory making her 
Scottish ties all the more important, 22 and had increased 
belief in the possibility of a Catholic crusade. The 
Guise family, the Hapsburgs and the Pope were the chief 
19 Ibid., pp. 195-196. 
20 Great Britain, Privy Council, Acts of the Privy 
Council of England: 1542-1628, Vol. VI (London: 1890-1946, 
West Salem, Wisconsin: Microcard Editions, 1966), p. x. 
21 wernham, Before the Armada, p. 246. 
22 Ibid., p. 249. 
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suspects in English eyes. 
Although the treaty had officially confirmed 
recognition of Elizabeth as England's Queen the barely 
latent fears were soon apparent. On 10th July, 1559, 
at a tournament celebrating the new peace, Henry II 
was killed. The young Dauphin became Francis II, a 
flexible instrument in the hands of the Guise faction. 
Applying pressure through their sister, the Scottish 
Queen Mother, and their niece, the Queen of Scots, the 
Guises forced Francis to pursue a policy aimed at restoring 
and extending French influence in Scotland. Francis and 
Mary began openly to flaunt the arms and style of the 
English monarch. 
Ten years earlier Henry II had boasted, "France 
and Scotland are now one country. 1123 This indeed seemed 
true in 1559, however Scotland had begun to question 
events which, since the formal transference of the 
regency to Mary Guise in 1554, had established French 
officials in all important government positions. It was 
feared that Mary Stuart would remain in France and govern 
Scotland as a French province. In religious matters the 
growing number of Protestants feared that extermination 
would be their ultimate fate. 24 Mary Tudor's rule in 
23 Ibid., p. 173. 
24William Croft Dickenson, Scotland from the 
Earliest Times to 1603 (London: Robert Cunningham and 
Sons, Ltd., 1961), p. 322. 
28 
England had driven many Protestants northwards and during 
the early days of her regency Mary Guise had attempted to 
maintain their allegiance through compromise. 25 To 
further the alliance between France and Scotland, however, 
was now her major aim, and as the reformers became more and 
more numerous and demanding, her policy veered from its 
middle course. With Elizabeth's accession she decided 
that the days of toleration were over. In Scotland, 
resentment against foreign domination had again aligned 
itself with religion. Just as in 1550 the old alliance 
and old faith had identified themselves with national 
independence against England, so in 1559 the reformers 
were able to make Protestantism a national movement 
against French imperialism. 26 
By 1558 Scottish national leaders were ready for 
action against France. Thus Elizabeth's accession, 
coinciding with more vigorous French policy was of 
tremendous importance to the Scottish Protestants who 
now felt that they could rely on English support to oust 
the French. Indeed it was in England's national interest 
to eliminate French rule in Scotland, as Cecil and 
27 Elizabeth were well aware. 
25 P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland to the Present 
Time, Vol. II (Cambridge: University Press, 1911),p. 37. 
26 Dickenson, Scotland from the Earliest Times 
to 1603, pp. 319 - 322. 
27 Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 88. 
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After the treaty of Cateau Cambr:sis the regent 
received instructions to crush the reform movement. A 
riot broke out in Perth and the armies of the regent and 
the congregation faced each other. The rebellion of the 
Scottish reformation had begun. 
The few months since Elizabeth 1 s accession had 
not been spent idly. Cecil had realized the necessity of 
strengthening the defences of England against Scotland 
and France and had set to work immediately to equip the 
channel squadron and continued the fortification of 
Berwick. 28 While favouring peace with France he was also 
encouraging attempts to kindle religious controversies 
there and in Scotland, 29 and was improving the financial 
situation and military supplies in England with the aid 
of Thomas Gresham, the royal agent in Antwerp. Although 
Cecil favoured aiding the Scots, his cautious sovereign 
was loathe to become involved. By the treaty of Cateau 
Cambr,sis England had pledged not to make war against 
France. England was still in no position to make war, and 
Elizabeth, still somewhat insecure on her throne, did not 
wish to encourage dissidents in her own realm by aiding 
30 
rebels in another. There was yet another reason for her 
28Acts of the Privy Council, Vol. Vtt, p. 4. 
29
c.S.P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. 19. 
300. k 1c enson. Scotland from the Earliest Times to 
1603, p. 328. 
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holding back. Earlier she had made it possible for 
John Knox to return to Scotland via England assuming that 
he would further inspire the reformers, making her aid 
unnecessary. Elizabeth had little time for Knox, in fact 
Cecil had to attempt to exclude him altogether in his 
negotiations with the Scots for fear that Elizabeth's 
anger toward him would cause her to halt even indirect aid. 
And yet one must wonder if she was not perhaps enjoying the 
irony of the author of the "First Blast of the Trumpet" 
begging for help from a woman ruler, and wishing to savour 
it to the full. 
Cecil had to content himself for the time being 
with espionage and harassment of the French in Scotland. 
He encouraged those who annoyed the French and advised 
holding those captured for questioning "to learne 
somewhat that may advaunce the servyce of the Quenes 
Maj es ti e . 11 3 1 T here were rum o a :rs f r:o m the nor.th of a 
possible French invasion against Scotland at Berwick or 
somewhere in England. 32 
In Scotland, meanwhile, the Protestants had 
conducted a successful campaign and captured Edinburgh, 
forcing the regent and her French forces to retire to 
Leith by September 1559. A month later they deposed 
Mary Guise transferring the government to the Hamilton's 
31 Acts of the Privy Council, Vol. VII, ;J. 32. 
32 
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and the Lords of the Congregation. The Duke of 
Chatelherault and his son the Earl of Arran had joined 
the Protestant ranks and, being the next heirs to the 
throne after Mary Stuart, had added some legitimacy to 
the Protestant cause. But the Scots had reached the peak 
of their military success. Their army, a band of ill-
trained, undisciplined, country folk, who had come to 
battle filled with religious zeal but few more practical 
supplies, 33 proved a poor match for the highly trained 
and experienced French forces. It became apparent that 
they could not hold out long if aid was not forthcoming. 
The Scots had been making overtures to the 
English earlier in the year, and in December 1559, 
Maitland, a skilful diplomat, was sent by the Scots to 
seek open aid from the English. Elizabeth had been 
providing money for the Scots since August described as 
"private loans" from Sir Ralph Sadler, one of her chief 
advisors on Scottish affairs. By the end of the year, 
however, news of French military preparations alarmed 
Cecil who began bringing extreme pressure to bear on 
the Queen. Through a weblike network of collaborators, 
Cecil fell back on what was to prove his favourite 
device for cajolling action out of his reluctant mistress. 
Using her representatives abroad, Sadler and Randolph in 
the north, Throckmorton in Paris, and Chaloner in Brussels, 
33 Brown, History of Scotland to the Present Time, 
Vol. II, p. 51. 
32 
he made Elizabeth aware of every possible suggestion of 
34 hostility on behalf of the French. He drafted an appeal 
for the Lords of the Congregation to send to Elizabeth. 
Couched in terms that would appeal to her, it stressed 
their loyalty to their true sovereign, but sought 
Elizabeth's protection against the French. 35 
In November 1559 two events occurred to aid Cecil 
in his tactics. Throckmorton returned from Paris with 
news of French religious problems, and the Protestants 
suffered a defeat in Scotland. The pressure had worked 
and Elizabeth laid the problem before her council. Kept 
largely in the dark until now, the council was far from 
agreeing with Cecil's bold policy. Their objections were 
not aimed at secret subsidies or "strange events at sea, 1136 
both of which could be denied, but invasion by land was a 
blatantly hostile act, and they doubted even Elizabeth's 
ability to deny any involvement in such policy. The 
newer councillors were willing to follow Cecil, but older 
members preferred to fall back on the safer Hapsburg 
11 . 37 a 1ance. 
The main opposition in the council was voiced 
by Nicholas Bacon on the following grounds: England 
34 Read. Cecil, p. 155. 
35 Ibid., p. 158. 
36wernham, Before the Armada, p. 251. 
37MacCaffrey, the Shaping of the Elizabethan 
B_~__Q_i_m e , p p . 8 7 - 8 8 • 
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lacked the men and money and the Scots were too weak to 
expel the French alone; England was disunited; assisting 
rebels against their rightful sovereign was unjust; 
France was four times as strong as England; little help 
could be hoped for from Spain and only active opposition 
from Rome; and it was better to be defensive, than ill-
prepared and offensive. He advised continuance of secret 
aid since the problem was not as imminent as it appeared, 
and in a year's time England would be better prepared to 
attack the French. 38 About the middle of December 
Admiral Winter was instructed to sail for Scotland with 
a fleet of fourteen ships and supplies. He was to 
intercept reinforcements from France to Scotland and to 
pick a quarrel with the French fleet if possible. 39 If 
questioned, however, he was to say that he acted on his 
own initiative. 
By 24th December, Cecil's victory in the council 
h d b d •t l d t . t 40 a een won an l was reso ve o in ervene. 
Norfolk, who had criticised Cecil earlier, was won over 
with a colourful role as the Queen's Lieutenant in the 
38 Read, Cecil, p. 159. 
39 
Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of 
State Pa ers, Domestic Series ... 1547-1625, Vol. VI 
Washington: Microcard Editions, 1964 , p. 144. 
40 
Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 93. 
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North. 41 He was instructed to proceed with the utmost 
care and invade only when it was clear that the regent 
would not negotiate. 42 Toward the end of December he 
moved to Newcastle to take charge of the forces there. 
On 27th December, Admiral Winter sailed for the Firth of 
Forth. The next day Elizabeth turned down the council's 
proposals. She may have shared Bacon's views and was 
aware of the clash in the council. She was also cautious 
over the cost of invasion, and preferred to gamble on her 
genius for secret diplomacy. In matters of war where there 
. •t El" b th f d. d .. 43 Sh was no unan1m1 y, lza e pre erre ln ec1s1on. e 
also hated aiding rebels, especially those whose 
religious inclinations were so strong. She was aware of 
the desirability of destroying French influence in· 
Scotland, but reluctant to help. 
The Scots and the English did not entirely agree 
on the aims of the war. The Scots wanted to depose the 
regent. evacuate the French and set up their own 
administrative committee. The English wanted security for 
England. Only Mary Guise's stubborn refusal to negotiate 
or recognize the Anglo-Scottish alliance united the two 
into a common cause, to expel the French. 44 In January, 
41 MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan 
Regime, p. 91. 
42 Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 43. 
43 Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 94. 
44 Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 46. 
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Winter's fleet successfully harassed the French ships in 
the Firth of Forth, and Providence seemed now to have 
sided with the English. A French fleet dispatched with 
reinforcements for Leith was caught in a storm and the 
ships that survived were forced back to the continent. 
In February, Elizabeth reluctantly gave Norfolk instructions 
to conclude with the Scottish nobles and on the 27th 
February a treaty of mutual defence was signed at Berwick. 
English aid now became a reality and Elizabeth became the 
protector of Scottish civil and religious liberties for 
the duration of the marriage of Mary and Francis and one 
year thereafter. 45 England was to send an army to Scotland 
to help expel the French, to be reciprocated should the 
46 
French invade England. Finally, the Scots testified 
to their loyalty to their Queen provided she did not 
47 
oppress the 11 just and ancient liberties of the kingdom. 11 
The Privy Council was now encouraging intervention. 
In an address to the Queen on 23rd March 1560, Mary and 
the Guises were described as mortal enemies and the 
councillors claimed that it was "just and honourable for 
her to aid the Scots to expel the French forces from 
that kingdom. 1148 Similar communications continued 
through May. In April, the English and Scottish forces 
~~Ibiq .• p. 44. 
46 wernham, Before the Armada, p. 255. 
47 oickenson, Scotland from the Earliest Times, p. 329. 
48c.S.P. Domestic Series, Vol. XI, p. 151. 
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joined, arriving at Leith on 8th of May. Their siege was 
poorly prepared and they lacked adequate equipment. 
The garrison, however, received no support from France 
and was ultimately forced to surrender. 49 
Meanwhile elaborate diplomatic manoeuvres were 
taking place between England, Scotland, Spain and the 
Netherlands. Philip II had offered to mediate in the 
conflict, but this suggestion was brought by a 
Spanish envoy, Glajon, from the Netherlands, where 
commercial interests were pro-English and anti-Spanish. 
Philip's offer was for Elizabeth to withdraw, he would 
then dispatch a Spanish force to punish the Scottish 
rebels with the help of France. Should France then attempt 
to invade England, he would protect Elizabeth. 5° Cecil 
used this opportunity to alarm the merchants, both in 
the Netherlands and England, creating tensions between 
the pro-Spanish de Quadra and pro-English Glajon. 
Gresham, too, was uttering suggestions that Spanish ships 
headed for the Netherlands might possibly be diverted to 
51 England instead. 
Encouraged, Elizabeth told Norfolk to push forward 
and embarked on her own double game, urging secret 
negotiations with the regent while applying pressure 
49
s1ack, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 47. 
50 Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 96. 
51 Read, Cecil, p. 167. 
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through her invading army. 52 In France, too, Throckmorton 
had held discussions with the Cardinal of Lorraine and, 
finding these unpromising, advised continuance of the 
invasion. A new French ambassador to England sent in 
February had confirmed the French determination to 
53 
assert the pretentions of Mary Stuart. Philip's 
attempts to mediate were met with news that the invasion 
was already underway. 
The French finally succumbed after two serious 
setbacks. The Tumult of Amboise brought their religious 
problems to the fore, and in Scotland, the regent died 
in Edinburgh Castle, on 10th June. All three parties 
were now ready to negotiate. 
The main object of Mary's regency had been to 
promote French ambition in Scotland, and in her 
determination to achieve this she was doomed to the same 
failure experienced by the English a decade earlier. 
Although forceful in her role and not easily defied, she 
never fully understood the realm she sought to oppress 
under foreign officials. Her actions transformed the 
traditional Scots' suspicion of the English into a dread 
of France. With her appointment to the regency the peak 
of French power in Scotland was achieved. Her demise 
symbolized the failure of their aims and the ultimate 
52 
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success of the Anglo-Scottich alliance. 
* * * 
What shall follow of my going towards Scotland, 
I know not, but I fear the success~ the Q's 
majesty is so evil disposed to the matter, which 
troubleth us all. 4 
It was not only Cecil who had misgivings about 
leaving the court. Many wondered who could possiblJ 
handle Elizabeth in his absence. but there was also 
general consensus that if anyone could negotiate a 
successful peace, he could. 55 The discussions were aided 
by further events which served to improve the English cause. 
A disaster to Phiip's forces at Tripoli made Spanish 
mediation, or interference, improbable, and domestic 
problems increased in France. 
Cecil and Wotton were to handle the negotiations 
with Randan and Valence, the two French representatives. 
The Scots were not included since the French refused to 
treat with the rebels, however the English demands were 
largely for the benefit of Scotland as well as England, 
and the Scots were satisfied with the promise of a future 
treaty with France. 
The preliminary instructions were drafted by 
Cecil. Mary and Francis were to abandon the use of the 
54 Ibid., p. 172. 
55 Ibid., p. 173. 
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arms and style of England, and recognize Elizabeth's 
title. A11 French troops were to be evacuated, although 
here the commissioners were given the right to allow 
residual forces to remain after consultation with the 
Scots. 56 French fortifications were to be demolished 
and the alliance between Elizabeth and the Scottish 
Lords was to be recognized. The elimination of French 
officials in the Scottish government was to be 
negotiated between France and Scotland. It was also 
suggested that the opportunity might be used to gain 
restoration of Calais. 57 The question of religion was 
deliberately ignored by Cecil except for a vague clause 
concerning freedom of conscience. He also wanted 
confirmation of the treaty of Gateau Cambresis. 58 Cecil 
wished for a close association, if not a union between 
England and Scotland. 
At the preliminary negotiations in Newcastle it 
was agreed to transfer the conference to Edinburgh, and 
an armistice came into effect on 17th June. The next day 
serious negotiations began. The first item to be discussed 
was the usurpation of the arms and style of Eng1and 59 and 
on this point Cecil and Wotton were successful. Using the 
threat of Norfolk's army to "persuade" the French to be 
56c. s. P. Foreign Series, Vo1. III, p. 112. 
57 Read, Cecil, p. 174. 58c.S.P. Foreign Series, 
Vo1. III, p. 173 59 Ibid., p. 129. 
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more honest, most of the articles were agreed upon by 
23rd June. The matter of Calais, although the French were 
at first reluctant to discuss it, was to be referred to 
a new treaty, and the Scots and French were to begin 
negotiations about withdrawal of troops and demolition 
of French fortifications. 
On 6th July, 1560, the Treaty of Edinburgh was 
signed. Cecil had essentially gained all England's 
demands. Conventions in London were to be held to 
consider compensation for the French use of the arms 
and style of England. The Scottish government was to 
be controlled by a council of twelve, to be selected 
by the Queen of Scots and the Lords, thus ousting French 
officeholders. Only on the matter of the Anglo-Scottish 
league was Cecil forced to accept an ambiguous statement, 
and the Scots would have preferred a more definite 
religious policy. 60 
The treaty was completed just in time, for three 
days later a letter arrived from Elizabeth demanding 
that negotiations cease unless Calais be returned and 
an indemnity paid. Fortunately this letter was to be 
effective only if negotiations were not already completed. 
The Treaty of Edinburgh was undoubtedly one of the 
greatest achievements of Elizabeth's reign. The Franco-
Scottish tie was replaced with an Anglo-Scottish alliance. 
60 
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Elizabeth had become the protector of a newly Protestant 
Scotland, and she could feel safe from French attack from 
the north. French troops were to be withdrawn and she was 
to be recognized as the sovereign of England. The treaty 
offset the disaster of Calais and strengthened hopes for 
Elizabeth's reign. 61 The eventual success of the 
Reformation was now assured in Scotland despite the fact 
that religious policy decided upon by the Scottish 
Estates was to be submitted to Mary and Francis for 
approval. The treaty was a triumph of prestige and 
honour, and England's reputation rose both nationally 
d . t• 11 62 an interna iona y. 
In Scotland, the political victory over the 
French was soon transformed into a religious one. The 
Estates, meeting after the treaty, abolished papal 
authority, outlawed the mass, and approved the 
Protestant Confession of Faith framed by Knox and his 
followers. 63 Thus the religious settlement which 
confronted Mary on her return to Scotland in 1561, after 
the death of her husband, must have been far from 
pleasing to the new Queen. Despite her apparent acceptance 
of the situation as she found it, there was little doubt 
that her long range policy would include an attempt to 
61 MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan 
Regime, p. 89. 
62 . Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 99. 
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salvage the wreck of the old church and the French 
11 . 64 a 1ance. 
Suspicion of these intentions was not eased by 
Mary's stubborn refusal to ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh. 
The treaty had called for renunciation of the English 
arms and style flaunted by Mary and Francis since 
Elizabeth's accession. 65 In ratifying the treaty, 
therefore, Mary would be relinquishing her claim to the 
throne of England. Attempts were made to delay her 
return to Scotland by refusing to grant a safe conduct 
1 h l . d . th' 66 un ess s e comp ie in is matter. Meanwhile support 
in Scotland was rallying around the new Queen. Young 
and attractive, she no longer personified the hated 
Guise connection and even the Protestant Anglophile 
party in Scotland began to plead for her recognition 
67 
at least as Elizabeth's successor. 
Mary's claim might have been harmless had it not 
been for religious complications. Backed by the Pope, 
Philip II and France she offered a potentially 
dangerous alternative to Elizabeth who was in no mood 
to establish her claim and encourage possible conspiracies 
68 
around her. With warnings to the Scots that Mary 
64 Ibid., p. 262. 
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"will alter many things in Scotland, especially the 
progress of religion and the devotion of many towards 
herself , 1169 Elizabeth stood her ground. Mary, denied 
the safe conduct, was forced to travel direct to Scotland 
landing at Leith in August 1561. 
The year which followed Mary's return to 
Scotland was marked by a definite effort 
on her part to get on with her Protestant 
subjects and to find a modus vivendi with 
her southern neighbour.70 
On condition that Mary recognized the authority 
of Murray 71 and Maitland she was allowed to continue 
the private practice of her religion. Accordingly, when 
choosing her councillors in September 1561 she included 
h bl 1 d . 72 A f b . f d t ose no es a rea y in power. part rom a r1e an 
unsuccessful rebellion by the Huntlys in September 1562, 
the first few years after her return were comparatively 
tranquil and much time was spent trying to further her 
claims to the English succession. Mary's moderate policies, 
however, once more opened the rift between Catholics and 
Protestants. No longer afraid of French domination, 
Catholics rallied to the Queen and the fortunes of the 
69c. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. IV, pp. 165-166. 
70 Read, Cecil, p. 228. 
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Protestant Lords came to depend on their success or 
failure in the succession question. 73 
Soon after Mary's arrival, therefore, Maitland 
was dispatched to London to resume negotiations. He 
pursued several courses in an effort to accomplish 
Mary's recognition. The Scots offered a compromise: 
formal acknowledgement of Elizabeth's title if she would 
accept Mary as heir presumptive. Despite Elizabeth's 
assurances that she preferred Mary's claim to all others, 74 
it was indeed debatable whether or not Parliament could 
have been induced to co-operate. Mary was very unpopular 
in England, especially with Parliament, where she was 
considered to be French, Guise, and Catholic. 75 
Thus thwarted, Maitland turned to an alternative 
scheme. Convinced that a suitable marriage for Mary 
would, in time, bring recognition, he concentrated his 
efforts in this area. For some time there had been talk 
of a proposed marriage to Don Carlos, son of Philip II 
and Maitland held talks with de Quadra, the Spanish 
ambassador, presumably to this end. By 1563, however, 
Mary's chance was all but gone. Renewed Anglo-French 
amity after the Treaty of Troyes denied Mary French 
73 Wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 262-263. 
74 Read, Cecil, p. 230. 
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support for her suit, and Philip II announced that his 
son's madness made the marriage impossible.76 
Attempts to arrange a meeting between the two 
Queens met with no success and in the autumn of 1563 
Elizabeth instructed Randolph, her representative in 
Scotland, to explain her position to Mary. Privately 
Elizabeth thought Mary's claim the strongest and had 
prevented Parliament from barring her succession 
altogether in 1562. 77 Mary's acceptance of Protestantism 
as the established religion in England would be essential 
if she hoped to become Queen. A French, Spanish, or 
Austrian marriage would make her claim impossible, 
however, a suitable match might allow further examination 
78 
of her case. 
It was in this last point that Mary saw her 
greatest opportunity, and two possible suitors appeared 
to be offered by Elizabeth. In March 1564 Randolph was 
79 
authorized to suggest Lord Robert Dudley, soon to be 
created Earl of Leicester, and in September, the Earl of 
Lennox was allowed to return to Scotland followed by his 
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son, Henry Lord Darnley.BO It has been suggested that 
Elizabeth's intention was to confuse Mary, keeping her 
unwed and thus allowing continued excuses for postponing 
her recognition.Bl Mary, however, was tiring of Elizabeth's 
procrastination and resolved to pursue her own course. 
In July 1565 with her marriage to Darnley she achieved 
what has been described as her "one great stroke of 
policy. 1182 
She triumphed in Scotland; she frightened 
Elizabeth; and she became once more an 
important personage in the eyes of 
continental potentates.83 
By her marriage, Mary had merged two claims to 
the English succession, 84 and Darnley's English birth 
would enable him to inherit the crown. What a pity that 
for all Mary's apparent political genius this "master 
stroke" would be transformed into a tragedy which 
would in the end cost her her kingdom. The price which 
she must pay for her defiance was high. She was saddled 
with an arrogant, despicable husband whose family was 
already embroiled in the clan feuds of Scotland. 
80 Brown, History of Scotland to the Present Time, 
Vol. II, p. 78. 
BlFraser, Mary Queen of Scots, p. 220. 
B2 Brown, History of Scotland to the Present Time, 
Vol. II, p. 79. 
83 Ibid. 
84 
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Within a month of the marriage Murray had been outlawed 
and the Scottish Lords had risen in rebellion. 
* * * 
In April 1565 Murray had withdrawn from the 
court joining Argyll and Chatelherault in August. The 
Lords' abortive rebellion, known as the Chaseabout Raid, 
lacked any substantial support and by October its 
leaders were exiles in England and Mary appeared 
triumphant. It was only natural that renewed instability 
in Scotland would invite the interest of foreign powers 
and especially close scrutiny from Elizabeth. 
The year 1565 showed signs of amity between the 
Pope, Philip II and Charles IX all of whom were pledged 
to exterminate heresy and restore the unity of Christendom. 85 
It appeared that Mary, by ousting her Protestant advisors, 
was about to lead the way in their crusade. Encouraged 
by rumours of a Catholic league she appealed to France 
and Spain for help, while Murray turned to Elizabeth. 
Although undoubtedly it was a major factor in 
sixteenth century politics, Elizabeth was convinced 
that religion was not all-important in shaping the 
f . 1. f h . hb 86 ore1gn po lcy o er ne1g ours. Threatened with 
rebellion in the Netherlands and suspicious of French 
85The final session of the Council of Trent had 
closed with the appearance of a united front among the 
Catholic powers pledged to overthrow Protestantism. 
86 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 35. 
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designs there, Philip, although a fanatical Catholic, 
had no desire to increase French influence in Scotland. 
France, constantly facing a Huguenot threat at home, 
was troubled by the progress of Alva's troops along the 
eastern French frontier toward the Netherlands. Fear of 
a conspiracy arising out of a meeting between Catherine de 
Medici and Alva at Bayonne resulted in a Huguenot call 
to arms, plunging France into her second religious war 
in 1567. 87 Since Spain and France, therefore, were too 
suspicious to co-operate and afraid to act alone they 
confined themselves to a warning that they would help 
88 
only if Elizabeth declared war on Mary. 
Mary's disastrous policies, however, made it 
unnecessary for Elizabeth to intervene. By her promotion 
of Catholics and aliens, leading to the murder of Rizzio 
in March 1566, she managed to bring about a reconciliation 
between Protestant and Catholic lords. 89 Her suspected 
involvement in Oarnley's murder and subsequent marriage 
to Bothwell denied her of what little support remained. 
By July 1567 Mary was a prisoner at Lochleven and the 
87 Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 294. 
88 Wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation and Price 
Revolution, p. 225. 
89 
The Protestant Lords Murray, Glencairn and Argyll, 
some of whom were implicated in the plot against Rizzio, were 
reconciled with the Catholics Bothwell, Huntly and Atholl 
who had helped Mary escape after Rizzio's murder. In April 
1566 all six were members of Mary's Privy Council. 
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Protestant Lords were in control with wide popular 
support. She had been forced to abdicate in favour of 
her thirteen-month-old son. James VI, who was a much 
90 
more acceptable candidate for the English succession. 
It appeared that Elizabeth had once again succeeded 
through inactivity. Her triumph, however, would not long 
be savoured. Early in May 1568 Mary escaped from her 
gaolers, joined the Hamilton's, and attempted to regain 
her throne. She was soundly defeated at Langside and 
fled southward, arriving in England 11 a fugitive and a 
suppliant in the kingdom which a few years before she 
had so proudly claimed as her own. 1191 
Elizabeth faced a dilemma from which the international 
situation robbed her of any easy solution. Deeply 
committed to the theory of divine right Elizabeth had 
spent the past year attempting to mediate between the 
Scottish Lords and their rightful Queen. It is possible 
that with this in mind Mary had thrown herself upon 
Elizabeth's mercy genuinely hoping that she would be 
restored. However, for the Protestant Queen of England 
to take up arms to restore her Catholic cousin would have 
ruined the English party in Scotland whom Elizabeth had 
no wish to alienate. 
90 Wernham, ed .• The Counter-Reformation and Price 
Revolution, p. 229. 
91 
Brown, History of Scotland to the Present Time, 
Vol. II, p. 91. 
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The old spectre of a Catholic conspiracy loomed 
large. The Pope was anxious to restore Mary as the 
protector of Roman Catholicism in Scotland and England, 
but his forces were limited. 92 Philip II was angered by 
Elizabeth's seizure of the Spanish pay ships and 
relations with Spain were deteriorating. 93 Yet the greatest 
threat appeared to come from France where religious war 
might lead to increased Guise influence at court. Lack 
of their traditional Burgundian alliance and loss of 
Calais from which to dominate the channel placed 
England in a particularly precarious position. 94 It was 
perhaps, therefore, to prevent any French interference 
that Elizabeth persisted in her bid for Mary's restoration 
while allowing her 11 trial 11 to drag on, thus avoiding any 
commitment which would have been opposed by the Scottish 
Lords. 
Although Elizabeth was successful in preventing 
any foreign intervention at this stage, her policy was 
to have serious consequences in the future. Deserted by 
her allies, Mary would remain in England, a prisoner in 
various castles, for the rest of her life. She would 
become the centre of a series of conspiracies to oust 
Elizabeth and restore Catholicism in England. By 
92 Read, Walsingham, Vol. II p. 119. 
93 Below pp. 77-78. 
94 
Read, Cecil, p. 398. 
51 
refraining from a definite verdict regarding Mary's guilt 
. 95 . 
or 1nnocence, Just enough doubt remained to keep the 
Marian faction alive in Scotland where it continued to 
plague the Protestant Lords. 96 
With Murray's recognition as Regent in July 1567, 
the factious Scottish nobles split once more. Murray, 
representing the English alliance, Protestantism and 
recognition of James, was opposed by a Marian faction 
refusing to recognize James or the Regent. While 
negotiations for Mary's restoration continued, her 
supporters took to arms launching a civil war which would 
continue for the next five years. The Perth Convention, 
assembled in July 1569 to discuss the problem of Mary, 
did nothing to mitigate her straits, and her attentions 
turned toward foreign and Catholic supported plots to 
aid her friends in Scotland and place her on the English 
throne. 
In Scotland, meanwhile, Murray's assassination in 
January 1570, followed by Marian raids into northern 
England induced Elizabeth to send troops to retaliate 
and infused Charles IX with renewed suspicions concerning 
her designs. Despite his initial indignation, however, 
relations between France and England were fairly friendly 
95After examining the evidence presented at the 
Conferences of York and Westminster the commissioners 
alleged that nothing had been proved against either 
Mary or Murray. 
96 
. Wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation and Price 
Revolution, p. 231. 
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and Mary's negotiations with Spain, about which Elizabeth 
took care to see that Charles was informed, 97 weakened 
her cause at the French court. After considering an offer 
by the Guises to aid Mary at their own expense, Charles 
resolved instead to reach an agreement with England on 
how the Scottish problem should be settled. 
Walsingham at this time was in France to negotiate 
an Anglo-French league and inevitably affairs in Scotland 
entered into the discussions. Walsingham suggested that 
Charles was afraid to oppose Mary entirely for fear that 
she might triumph, gain the throne of England, and unite 
with Scotland and Spain against France. 98 Charles 
protested against Elizabeth's intention to send troops 
warning that he would be forced to help the Marians if 
she did. He also sent an envoy, Du Croc, Guisan in 
sympathy, to England, with vague instructions to deal 
with the matter of Scotland. Ultimately, however, the 
Scottish settlement in the Treaty of Blois, concluded 
19 April 1572, omitted any mention of Mary's welfare 
and made provision for Anglo-French co-operation to 
99 bring peace to Scotland. 
Commissioners from both countries proceeded to 
Scotland and managed to arrange an Abstinence in 
August 1572 which was extended to the end of the year. 
97 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 188. 
98 Ibid., p. 184. 99 Ibid., p. 194. 
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The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's, however, crushed the 
last hopes of the Marians and prodded Elizabeth into a 
more severe course of action. After failing to negotiate 
for Mary's execution by the Scots 100 in March 1573 she 
dispatched a force under Drury to besiege Edinburgh 
Castle, the last Marian stronghold. The surrender of the 
castle in May marked the end of the Marians in Scotland 
and henceforth the Scottish problem would revolve not 
around the question of Mary's restoration but of 
l 0 l 
controlling James. 
If Mary had been of a less sanguine and more 
patient nature, if she had ruminated on the 
lessons of the past, if instead of being an 
inveterate plotter and fluent liar she had 
been content with one string to her bow at a 
time, if, in short, she had been honest over 
these negotiations - then there is scarcely 
a doubt that Elizabeth would have restored 
her, a crippled Queen maybe, but free and a Queen. lu~ 
After July 1567 the main theme running through 
all Elizabeth's negotiations with the Scots was a request 
for Mary's restoration. The terms were to be stringent, 
demanding Mary's ratification of the Treaty of Edinburgh 
end delivery of James as a hostage to be brought up in 
England. As late as February 1571 Elizabeth was still 
refusing to recognize James VI as King of Scotland, 103 
lOOC. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. X, pp. 523-524. 
101 conyers Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 108. 
102 Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 198. 
103wernham, Before the Armada, p. 309. 
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despite much persuasion from the Regent Lennox. What was 
it then which caused her change of heart? 
While the Marian faction in Scotland had rebelled 
against Murray in 1569 Elizabeth had faced a crisis at 
home. Resentment against her policies and Cecil's 
growing influence crystallized around a plot to marry 
Mary to Norfolk, bring about her restoration and 
re-establish Catholicism in England. The plot revealed, 
Norfolk was arrested and in November the northern 
Lords Northumberland and Westmorland rose in rebellion. 
Lacking anticipated support from Scotland or Spain the 
revolt failed and Marian raids against loyal nobles in 
the north provided Elizabeth with an excuse to proceed 
against Edinburgh. The collapse of the insurrection 
also revealed that most English Catholics were loyal 
subjects, demonstrating the basic stability of Elizabeth's 
regime, 104 and diminishing her constant dread of an 
English Catholic uprising in favour of Mary Stuart. 
Fear of a foreign conspiracy remained, however, 
and the events which followed the Northern Rebellion 
would reinforce it. Norfolk, released from the Tower in 
August 1570, immediately became embroiled in a second 
plot much more dangerous than the first. His servants 
were intercepted carrying money to the Marians and the 
Ridolfi Plot was revealed. This conspiracy called for 
Alva to send troops, money and arms from the Netherlands 
l0 4R d h T d ea , T e u ors, p. 178. 
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to aid a revolt in England led by Norfolk and his 
followers. Elizabeth was to be siezed, Catholicism 
restored, and Mary and Norfolk would rule England and 
Scotland. 105 Investigations showed that de Spes, the 
Spanish ambassador, was heavily implicated and he was 
expelled in December 1571. Norfolk's arrest and execution 
followed, and with the occurrence of St. Bartholomew's 
Massacre in France in August, the threat of a Catholic 
crusade against England seemed imminent. 
In February 1570 Pius V had issued his Bull 
Regnans in Excelsis excommunicating Elizabeth and 
absolving her subjects from obedience. Despite apparent 
106 
annoyance on the part of Philip II and Charles IX it 
was difficult for Elizabeth to believe that the Bull had 
been published without their consent. 107 It was a well 
known fact that France, especially the Guise faction, 
had been sending aid and encouragement to the Marians 
at Edinburgh. The complicity of the French King was 
uncertain but there was little doubt that once he had 
subdued the Huguenots he would intervene vigourously 
in Scotland. 108 It was therefore exped1~nt that 
Elizabeth take advantage of French impotence and destroy 
109 Mary's cause. 
105 Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 200. 
106 Ibid., p. 195. 107 Read, Burghley, p. 24. 
108Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 128. 
109wernham, Before the Armada, p. 326. 
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Despite French ambassador Fenelon's protests, 
Charles was unable to take any action against Elizabeth. 
He was far more concerned about preventing her assistance 
to the Huguenots in the religious war which raged in France 
11 0 
as a result of the massacre. With the fall of Edinburgh 
Castle Mary's cause and that of Catholicism died in 
Scotland. The Regent, Morton, was strongly Protestant 
and pro-England. With Mary's party destroyed as a 
fighting force the danger of foreign intervention was 
111 diminished. 
* * * 
For the next five years Scotland remained 
comparatively calm and during this period relations 
with England revolved mainly around the question of 
pensions. Since his appointment as Regent in 1572, 
Morton had been asking Elizabeth to enter into a defensive 
league with Scotland and to secure support for England 
by "judicious distribution of pensions. 11112 This policy, 
although supported by most of her councillors, was not 
acceptable to the thrifty Elizabeth. By April 1575, 
W 1 . h . f . . F h t• · 113 a sing am was warning o increasing renc ac ivity, 
possibly in an effort to persuade his reluctant mistress, 
llOR d ea , 
111 Ibid. 
11 3 
_c___ s. 
Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 130. 
ll2Ib"d l . ' p . l 31. 
P. Domes t_i_s__i_~i es, Vol. I, p. 496. 
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but it appears that Catherine de Medici had managed to 
114 h . fl nourish a French party w ose 1n uence came 
eventually to be expressed in opposition to Morton. 
By autumn Henry Killigrew, one of Elizabeth's 
am bass ado rs i n Scot l and, w a s obs er v i n g the de v e l op men t 
of a faction of nobles antagonistic to Morton and pleas 
for pensions to maintain his influence continued. 
Elizabeth, at this stage, preferred to mediate between 
the groups and it was not until June 1578, on receiving 
news of the Dutch defeat at Gembloux, that she was 
11 5 prepared to open negotiations for a defensive league. 
It was already too late, however, for in March James VI, 
persuaded by Morton's opponents, had assumed the 
government in his own hands and called for Morton's 
resignation. Although Mar was able to claim the 
guardianship of James and restore Morton by May, his 
days were numbered. The coalition which opposed Morton 
was powerful indeed and his pleas for aid to Elizabeth 
fell on cautious ears. It was clear that the two parties 
in Scotland were now evenly matched and Elizabeth was 
loathe to provide the French with an excuse to become 
involved by taking sides herself. 116 She resolved 
therefore, to mediate the dispute thus attempting to 
maintain the goodwill of both factions. 
Some appearance of harmony had been established 
114Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 132f. 
l1 5 Ibid . , p . 144. ll 6 Ibid . , p . 1 5 3. 
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by the end of the year and it seemed that James's 
ambition to succeed Elizabeth would be a potent factor 
in maintaining his co-operation. 117 A dispute over the 
Lennox title and land, however, provided an avenue for 
further French intrigue. The Sieur d'Aubigny, French 
claimant to the estates, arrived in Scotland during 
the summer of 1579. He was Catholic, an emissary of 
the Guises, and suspected of working in the interests 
of Mary Stuart. He was also handsome, an accomplished 
t . d d ·t h 118 He pr t d th cour ier an an a ro1 sc emer. re esen e e 
French alliance and break from England and within a 
month he had become a force to be considered in 
Scottish politics. 
In October 1579, Errington, an agent sent to 
Scotland to discover the effect of D'Aubigny's coming, 
119 
reported that he was high in favour with James. This 
became apparent the following May when he received large 
land grants and the Lennox Earldom (elevated to a Dukedom 
in 1581). Allied with Captain James Stewart (created 
Earl of Arran in 1581) he would form the focal point 
for Guise and Catholic schemes in Scotland for the next 
three years. Walsingham had already begun to 11 smell in 
the air some scent of the Guisan and Spanish plots 
l l 7 I b i d . , p • 1 5 4. 
l l 8 I b i d . • p . 1 5 5. 
11 9 Ibid. 
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120 
against England which were ... developing in Paris." 
D'Aubigny's ultimate task was to restore Mary Stuart and 
Catholicism, his immediate purpose was to discredit Morton. 
With the aid of French gold he quickly rallied 
the discontented elements and by the end of 1580 was 
ready to make his move. Summoned to appear before the 
council, Morton was charged with complicity in the 
Darnley murder, convicted.and executed the following 
June. It would seem that D'Aubigny, now in supreme control, 
could advance his major policy. Early in 1580 rumours 
abounded of a Guise plot to restore Mary in Scotland and send 
1 21 James to France. The following year Walsingham was 
warning of a scheme to invade Scotland supported by the 
122 
Pope and Philip II. While in France trying to negotiate 
an Anglo-French alliance he wrote: 
The Duke of Guise is of late crept into very 
inward credit with the King, which ought to 
move her Majesty to be more careful of the 
matters of Scotland, for that there are 
daily consultations in the Duke's house, 
especially since advertisements are come 
hither out of Scotland that the King doth 
submit himself to any such direction as his 
mother shall give him, even so far forth as 
the yielding up of the g?~3rnment to her if 
she shall think it meet. 
It appeared certain that English interests 
were seriously threatened, but D'Aubigny's victory was 
120Ibid., p. 159. 
1 21 Brown, History of Scotland to the Present Time, 
Vol. II, p. 139. 
122 Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 373. 
123 
Ibid., p. 174. 
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not complete. The scheme to transport James to France 
not only aimed to restore Catholicism in Scotland but 
also at his conversion. 124 This prospect, together with 
increased Jesuit activity in Scotland, alarmed Arran who 
began to build a party among the Protestant Lords. 
It appeared, too, that James 1 s seeming acquiescence in 
his mother 1 s schemes was designed chiefly to gain her 
support for his recognition as Elizabeth 1 s successor. 125 
Several possibilities were thus presented to 
Elizabeth. In an attempt to strengthen the Protestant 
party she aimed to widen the breach between D1 Aubigny 
and Arran. When evidence of a disagreement appeared 
between D1 Aubigny and Mary, Elizabeth chose to play 
I f • • h" h 126 James s av.our1te against is mot er. Negotiations 
were reopened with Mary suggesting increased liberty 
for her return .for her co-operation against D1 Aubigny. 
It was possible that these were designed also to deceive 
127 
the French, as suggested by the Spanish ambassador. 
Finally, Elizabeth never forgot James 1 s major ambition, 
to be her successor to the crown of England. She seldom 
missed an opportunity to warn him that co-operation 
with D1 Aubigny and the French would jeopardize his chances. 
While the Jesuits unfolded their plans to restore 
124 Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 363. 
125 Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 175. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Read, ~~. p. 284. 
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Scotland to the Catholic fold, Elizabeth was intriguing 
with the Earl of Angus to overthrow D'Aubigny. Their 
128 
designs culminated in the Raid of Ruthven in August 1582, 
which placed James in the possession of the English 
party. Co-operating with the raiders, James declared 
himself a free agent and D'Aubigny was ordered to leave. 
Friendly relations with England were restored. 
France was not yet ready to concede the victory. 
Toward the end of the year two ambassadors were dispatched 
to Scotland, Fenelon via England and Maineville direct. 
Fenelon was detained in London to await D'Aubigny's 
departure. He proceeded to Scotland accompanied by 
William Davison in January 1583. His instructions were to 
free James from his captors, but he arrived to find James 
co-operating and the mission appeared fruitless. However 
Maineville, who was backed by the Guises, did manage to 
restore some French influence thereby laying the groundwork 
129 
for James's escape in June. 
Since 1580 the Guises had been promoting a scheme 
to invade England and Scotland with the support of Philip II 
130 
and the Pope. It was to this end that the Jesuits had 
been used as messengers from the various parties to 
D'Aubigny in Scotland. The plan called for Spanish and 
128 
Brown, History of Scotland to the Present Time, 
Vol. II, pp. 146-147. 
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Papal troops aiding D'Aubigny to restore Catholicism in 
Scotland as a preliminary to an invasion Gf England: 
Thwarted by uncertainty on Philip's behalf and delayed 
by the Ruthven Raid, these schemes were held in abeyance 
until mid-1583 when James's escape activated them once 
more. It was in this phase that Francis Throckmorton 
became involved and his capture and subsequent 
confessions put an end to the plot. 
It was reasonably clear that this scheme had been 
devised without the compliance of Henry III 131 and, 
apart from the Guise involvement, belongs more in the 
realm of Anglo-Spanish than of Anglo-French relations. 
Encouraged by his increased strength since acquiring 
Portugal, and angered by Elizabeth's involvement in the 
Netherlands revolt, it seemed that Philip was merely 
biding his time awaiting a suitable excuse to attack 
England. With the dismissal of Mendoza, for his 
part in the Throckmorton Plot, relations between England 
and Spain appeared doomed. Threatened by Jesuit advances 
in England, revolution in Ireland and open hostility from 
Spain, Elizabeth turned in desperation to a renewal of 
the French marriage negotiations. Her greatest fear, 
however, was that James was now ready for an association 
. G . 132 
with the u1ses~ thus opening, once more, her pastern 
131R d ea • Halsingham, Vol. II, p. 375. 
132 
Fraser, Mary Queen of Scots, p. 458f. 
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gate to foreign invasion. 
Three courses were explored by Elizabeth during 
the coming months to prevent this misfortune. First, 
James's growing independence offered the possibility of 
a humane solution to the problem of his mother. Believing 
in Mary's influence over James, Elizabeth once more 
broached the subject of her liberty. This was to be 
granted if James promised to maintain the English alliance 
133 
and with suitable guarantees from France. It soon 
became apparent, however, that James cared little for 
his mother's fate and her persistent scheming made any 
settlement along these lines impossible. 
Elizabeth therefore contemplated an alternative 
plan, to foment rebellion among the Scottish nobles, 
some of whom were alarmed at the stand James appeared 
t b k . 1 . . l 34 A t J o e ta ing on re ig1on. n attemp to remove ames 
from Arran's influence by capturing Stirling Castle in 
April 1584 was easily reversed, and Arran emerged as the 
supreme arbiter of Scottish policy for the following year. 
Elizabeth's third possibility was one which 
had been contemplated for some time, known as the 
"by-course". This amounted to an effort to win Arran 
133 
Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 269. 
134 
The Scottish ministers were attempting to 
remove the King's right to interfere in spiritual affairs 
by abolishing the office of Bishop. James continued to 
insist on his right to appoint Bishops and the "Black Acts" 
passed in May 1584 strengthened his authority to their 
exasperation. 
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over to the English cause and use him to detach James 
from Guise influence. Arran seemed prepared to co-operate 
in order to gain Elizabeth's favour and negotiations 
took place in August 1584. 
Due to the machinations of Patrick, Master of Gray, 
relations between England and Scotland were eventually 
stabilized. Originally sent to Scotland by the Guises, 
Gray was commissioned by James and Arran in October 1584 
1 35 to negotiate with England. Won over by Walsingham he 
became somewhat of a triple agent serving Arran, Mary and 
Elizabeth. 136 Within a short space of time it became 
clear that Mary's influence in Scotland need no longer be 
feared and by the end of 1585 Arran had been ousted. James, 
no longer a mere plaything in the hands of his councillors, 
was willing to negotiate a league. 
By July 1586, James was an English pensioner 
bound to assist Elizabeth if she were attacked and pledged 
. t h . 137 to give no succour o er enemies. It was fortunate, 
for Walsingham was warning that events (did) "plainly 
show that Spain and France run one course against us both 
in this and in all other actions. 11138 and with Alenson 
gone, Elizabeth was forced finally to play her hand in that 
other theatre, the Netherlands. 
l 35 
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CHAPTER TWO 
NO SEMBLANCE OF UNITY. 
A land with no semblance of unity in which the 
nobility had been quarrelling with the merchants, 
the burghers with the artisans, the cities with 
the countryside, and the trades with Tach other 
for as long as anyone could remember. 
The seventeen provinces known as the Spanish 
Netherlands, ancient heritage of the Dukes of Burgundy, 
were part of the vast empire inherited by Charles V 
and bequeathed by him to his son, Philip II. They 
comprised a confusing tangle of political chaos, where 
counties, duchies, or cities jealously guarded their 
ancient privileges under a recalcitrant native nobility. 
Their divisive character was further emphasized by the 
absence of any linguistic unity and nurtured by an 
intense trade rivalry between the cities. 
Traditionally the sovereign had exercised only 
limited power in the Netherlands and any centralizing 
tendencies had been rigourously opposed. Thus when the 
area was added in 1555 to the realm of the fanatical 
political introvert, Philip II, it was inevitable that 
these irreconcilable forces would eventually clash. 
lCicely V. Wedgwood, William the Silent: William 
of Nassau, Prince of Oran e: 1533-1584 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1944 , p. 36. 
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Philip made little effort to appear as anything other 
than a foreigner to the Netherlands. He was involved 
in a war with France which was unpopular with his 
subjects. and his repeated demands for subsidies made 
it look as if Netherlands' funds were being used to 
enhance Spanish power in Europe. 2 His request to the 
States General in 1556 was countered with a demand for 
removal of Spanish troops and respect for the ancient 
liberties and privileges of the Netherlands. 
Determined to have his way, Philip embarked on 
a policy aimed at eroding these native sources of power. 
His Regent. Margaret of Parma. was instructed to consult 
only with a three-man inner council, appointed by Philip 
and directly under his control. The nobles thus became 
a hollow voice, their advice and pleas unheeded by an 
alien absentee ruler. 
It was Philip's fanatical Catholicism. however, 
which radicalized the opposition and increased the 
apprehensions of his subjects. The persecution in 
England under his wife, Mary Tudor, had been observed 
with grave foreboding from across the channel where it 
3 
was commonly suspected that they were next in line. 
The established church had sunk to a low level 
in the Netherlands during the first half of the sixteenth 
century and reform was long overdue. Charles V, in 
2 
Ibid., p. 37. 3Ibid., p. 24. 
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attempting to arrest the decay, had introduced the 
Inquisition as a mechanism to carry out his proclamations. 
The Netherlands. however, with its many commercial 
contacts, could not be isolated from the influences of 
the Reformation. Despite a prohibition on Calvin's 
works issued in 1550, the end of the war against 
France had reopened traffic between the two areas and 
brought with it a new flood of Calvinist influence. 4 
Thus Philip's determination to strengthen his 
ecclesiastical authority, illustrated in his plan to 
reorganize the Netherlands bishoprics, crystallized 
political and religious opposition into a national 
movement. 
The revolt which followed found initial 
expression in a demand for the withdrawal of Cardinal 
Granvelle and restoration of the power of the nobility. 
Spearheaded by the Calvinist mob, however, it was 
ultimately transformed into a religious struggle which 
rent the national movement asunder. Given the character 
of the Netherlands, with its regional jealousies and 
endless competition, one must question whether a purely 
political rebellion would have been any more effective. 
There is little doubt that religious persecution fanned 
the smouldering embers of political dissent. The violent 
4 P. Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands: 1555-
1609 (London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1932), p. 36. 
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tactics of the Calvinists, however, alienated many 
who had no intention of replacing Catholic tyranny 
with Puritan incendiarism. The end result was far from 
William of Orange's ideal of an independent United 
Netherlands where freedom of conscience prevailed for 
all. Instead the Netherlands, divided along religious 
lines, became a theatre for civil war and foreign 
intrigue for almost a century, evolving ultimately 
into the separate political entities of Holland, 
Belgium and Luxemburg. 
The revolt in the Netherlands opened a new 
arena to Elizabethan intrigue, but the stage was 
cluttered with many complicating factors. By the mid-
sixteenth century English exports were chiefly in the 
form of cloth carried by the Merchant Adventurers and 
5 distributed through Antwerp. Trade was always a major 
consideration to Elizabeth and Cecil, and when trouble 
seemed imminent they took steps to locate new markets, 6 
but in 1563, when Margaret closed Netherlands ports to 
English ships and traders, it appeared that their 
prosperity was seriously threatened. Granvelle, the 
author of this policy, was convinced that English 
merchants were spreading Protestant ideas, and his. 
convictions were supported by Elizabeth's involvement 
7 in the French religious war. 
5 Read, Cecil, p. 289. 6 Ibid., p. 167. 
7 Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 282. 
70 
The ban resulted in retaliation from Elizabeth 
and in 1564 the Merchant Adventurers carried their cloth 
to Emden. Although the market was less lucrative than 
Antwerp, the- embargo proved more serious for Spain than 
for England, and the following year terms were accepted 
to resume normal trade. Although economic relations 
remained in a state of flux for another decade, there 
was sufficient commerce to ensure that it was a factor 
to be considered in Netherlands policy. No matter how 
much she was tempted to keep Philip occupied with 
trouble in the Netherlands, Elizabeth was loathe to 
allow total chaos to break out and jeopardize her 
prosperity. 
The revolt also provided Elizabeth with an 
opportunity to play on the ancient Hapsburg - Valois 
rivalry. The Treaty of Cateau Cambresis had closed 
with an aura of friendship around Spain and France 
cemented by the marriage of Philip to Elizabeth of 
Valois and leaving England confronted by a formidable 
alignment of power on the continent. By taking sides 
with one or the other in the Netherlands, however, and 
adding to suspicion about their aims there, she was 
able to prevent any joint action against herself. 
Elizabeth's policy in the Netherlands often 
appeared inconsistent and frequently drove her councillors 
to near distraction. She hated supporting rebels against 
their rightful monarch and feared that her involvement 
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might advance Mary Stuart's cause at home. She also 
despised being the champion of fanatical Calvinists 
even though they provided a buffer for Counter-
Reformation forces yearning for a chance to strike at her. 
In the final analysis, however, it was a fear of 
France which coerced her into action. Elizabeth was 
always suspicious that France intended to annex the 
Netherlands and she was determined to forestall them. 
Although she was prepared to suggest joint action, 
subsidize French Huguenots and even AlenJon to aid the 
rebels, at the least indication that France might be 
gaining ground she would side with Philip to prevent 
a French takeover. A French Netherlands would have been 
disastrous to England. Geographically adjacent to one 
another as they were, Elizabeth would be unable to 
disrupt communications as she could between the 
Netherlands and Spain. If an independent Netherlands, 
allied to England through religion and commercial 
interests, was to be denied her, there was no doubt 
that Elizabeth considered a Spanish Netherlands the 
lesser of the two alternative evils. 
* * * 
In 1559 Philip expounded his plan to reorganize 
the bishoprics in the Netherlands. Promulgated by Papal 
Bull in 1561 it aimed to reform a corrupt church and 
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8 
strengthen the fight against heresy, by creating 
new bishoprics and ensuring that rights of appointment 
9 
reverted to the crown. It was greeted with a storm of 
protest in the Netherlands. Abbots and nobles saw in it 
an attempt to decrease their income and influence. 10 
The plan, which had been developed without consulting 
the nobility, was being imposed by a foreign King and 
it aroused much hatred which came to be directed 
against its executors. 
Already opposition to Cardinal Granvelle had 
stirred in the political sphere due to his dominant 
position on Philip's hated council. Thus, in 1561, 
when as Archbishop of Malines and primate of the 
Netherlands church he became responsible for carrying 
out the King's religious reforms, frustration over 
these policies gathered against him. 
The opposing forces, however, were plagued with 
internal dissentions. The leading nobles who objected to 
infringement of their privileges were William of Orange and 
the Counts of Egmont and Hoorn. There were those, however, 
such as Aerschot, who remained loyal to Philip thus 
providing him with an excuse for intrigue. 
8 
H. G. Koenigsberger and G. L. Moss, Europe in the 
Sixteenth Century (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
Inc., 1968), p. 256. 
9Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 48. 
10 Wernham, ed. The Counter-Reformation and Price 
Revolution, p. 266. 
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Supporting one or other faction were several members of 
the greater or lesser nobility representing every shade 
of opinion from radical Calvinist to loyal Catholic. 11 
It was therefore impossible to achieve any consistent 
policy or maintain a united front against Philip. 
Embassies dispatched to Madrid in the early 1560's 
failed to convince Philip to alter his policies. In 
November 1565, the Segovia letters brought his reply. 
Sterner repression was to be applied. It was obvious 
that Philip intended to ignore advice and persist in his 
hated course in the face of all opposition. The nobles 
who had attempted to work within the government now 
withdrew, joining the more radical lower nobility in a 
league to protest Philip's policies. 
Calling for abolition of the Inquisition and 
moderation of the edicts against heretics the league 
drew up a position to be presented to Margaret. 
Although it appeared that national consciousness was 
finally breaking through the shell of noble rivalries, 12 
it was not a truly united nobility which confronted the 
Regent. Nevertheless, a moderation of religious policy 
suspended the hated edicts and an Accord was reached 
with Margaret pending a reply from Philip. 
There was confusion, however, as to exactly 
11 Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 52. 
1 2 
Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, p. 89. 
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what had been granted by the Accord. Protestant refugees, 
considering the edicts abolished, returned from exile and 
13 public preaching started. Incidents of image-breaking 
and mob violence occurred, originating in Antwerp and 
spreading elsewhere, throughout 1566. Frightened by 
this fierce emergence of Calvinism, Catholics and 
moderates rallied to support Margaret, who now emerged 
f h I d . 14 as protectress o c urc1 an society. 
William of Orange still hoped to steer a middle 
course and therefore ignored the pleas for help from the 
Calvinists. Instead he Jssisted Margaret in her efforts 
to keep the peace. 15 After her siege of Valenciennes in 
December and annihilation of rebel forces, Margaret was 
charged with having broken the Accord. The rift among 
the nobles was by now clearly visible. Egmont and Hoorn 
joined the court party to carry out Margaret's policies. 
Others took to arms with the rebels. William, denounced 
as a traitor, withdrew to Dillenburg where he hoped to 
muster aid from Germany to pursue his moderate aims. 
In August 1567 Philip's reply arrived. Spanish troops 
had been dispatched under the Duke of Alva. Their 
mission was to carry out vengeance on the Netherlands. 16 
l 
3 
I b . d 9 0 l 4 I b i· d . , p . 9 5. 
_l_.' p. . 
15 
Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 84. 
16 
Geyl, The Revolt of the Nether1 ands, p. 99. 
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Alva came not only to visit the evil-doers 
with merciless retribution and wipe out the 
last vestiges of sedition and heresy, but to 
destroy the ancient privileges of the country, 
the root of all the evil, and to raise up on 
the site thus cleared and levelled the straight, 
symmetrical 19ifice of absolutism, the ideal of 
t h_ e n e w a g e . 
Following the abortive revolt of 1567 most of the 
leaders of the opposition to Philip had left the 
Netherlands and those remaining showed much readiness 
to accept his new representative. 18 Egmont and Hoorn, 
together with Aerschot and other loyal Catholics, had 
taken the new oath of loyalty required by Margaret in 
February. Alva, however. was determined that there 
should be no misconception about his task. Immediately 
on his arrival he arrested Egmont, Hoorn, and all others 
suspected of complicity in the uprising. Establishing the 
1 9 Council of Blood to condemn wrongdoers he embarked on 
a campaign of terror which so cowed the people of the 
Netherlands that no town dared rise to aid their liberator 
20 
when William invaded in 1568. 
11 Never was nation subjected to a reign of terror 
with more calculated deliberation or more systematic 
persistence~ 21 Within a short period Alva's authority 
17 Ibid., p. 100. 1_8_;.Ib;__i_d., p. 99. 
19The Council of Troubles, called the Council of 
Blood by the Netherlanders, consisted of three members, 
all Spaniards, under Alva's chairmanship. It became the 
highest organ of government after its establishment in 1567. 
20 Wernham. ed., The Counter-Reformation and Price 
Revolution, p. 271. 
21 Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, p. 104. 
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was firmly established and the fate of the Netherlands 
appeared to be sealed. William's invasion was afflicted 
from the start with many problems: Although mercenaries 
were plentiful he had been unable to coax any substantial 
aid out of the German Lutherans. With the Netherlands 
successfully intimidated few of his countrymen dared 
contribute to his campaign. 
Despite initial successes by his brother, Louis 
22 
of Nassau, William was unable to pursue his advantage 
and mount a major campaign. He was subjected to a 
waiting game by Alva who chose to observe rather than 
engage the rebels. William's limited funds were finally 
exhausted and his bands of unpaid mercenaries were 
unleashed upon the countryside. The "liberators" began 
to appear little better than the Spaniards. William, 
fleeing from his own army, joined forces with the 
Huguenots who were about to embark on their third 
1 . . . F 2 3 re ig1ous war in ranee. 
Disaster for William, however, did not immediately 
mean triumph for Alva. Ironically the Spanish commander 
would soon be faced with the same problem of how to pay 
his troops. Since he lacked the machinery with which to 
raise taxes he was forced either to summon the States 
General or rely on funds from Spain. Shipments from Spain 
were subject to the uncertainties of passage through the 
22 Louis had invaded from East Friesland in April 
1568 and defeated the Spanish at Heiligerlee. 
23 Geyl, :he Revo 1 t of the Netherlands, p. 107. 
77 
channel where pirates abounded and the weather was 
treacherous. In November 1568, therefore, when a 
combination of these dangers scared a fleet of Spanish 
ships into Plymouth and Southampton, "divine Providence" 
and the Queen of England united to strike a serious blow. 
For some time relations between Spain and England 
had been deteriorating. Basic differences in religion 
d . . l l d . . bl d. t 24 b an economic r1va ry e inev1ta y to ispu es ut 
Elizabeth's fear of France had curbed her hostility and 
forced her to maintain a pretence of Anglo-Spanish 
friendship. By 1568, however, she was less apprehensive. 
The continual problem of religious war in France had 
reduced her activity in international affairs. Also, 
in June 1568 a suggestion had been made to bring about 
a match between the Duke of Anjou, brother of the French 
King, and Elizabeth. This offered an alternative to the 
Hapsburg match with the Archduke Charles, for which 
25 
negotiations had recently been discontinued. In the 
anticipation, therefore, of an Anglo-French alliance 
Elizabeth was prepared to follow a bolder policy toward 
Spain. 
In December she impounded the Spanish pay fleet 
and made arrangements with the Genoese bankers to have 
their !85,000 loan destined for Alva's army, transferred 
24 
Bla~k,-The~Reign of Elizabeth, p. 119. 
25 
Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 295. 
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26 
to her. Seizure of property and reprisals followed, 
suspending trade between England and the Netherlands 
once more, but it soon became obvious that Elizabeth 
was getting the best of the situation. The Merchant 
Adventurers had been reorganized under a new charter in 
1567 27 and were able to sell their cloth at Hamburg. 
The trade stoppage was ruinous to N~therlands and Spanish 
merchants, however, and by March 1569 Alva had no 
28 
alternative but to impose taxes in order to pay his army. 
The States General was summoned to approve his Tenth 
29 Penny Tax. Angry over the loss of English trade and 
reluctant to finance their own demise the States 
refused his request for the tax but agreed to a grant 
instead. Alva's tax was shelved until 1572 allowing the 
rebels time to consolidate their forces. Although the 
revolt, for the moment, was confined to the piratical 
escapades of the Sea Beggars, Alva's financial policy 
had served to stimulate a significant opposition 
element in the Netherlands. 
Commissioned by William to sail for the Principality 
of Orange, the unpredictable gang known as the Sea Beggars 
had, with Louis of Nassau's aid, established its headquarters 
at La Rochelle. 3° From this base it ravaged channel shipping, 
26 Ib'd 297 27 Ib1'd., p. 284. 
_l_.' p. . 
28 Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 185. 
29 Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, p. 108. 
30 
Lb i d . , p . l l 4 . 
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especially Spanish, with the support of the French 
31 Huguenots and connivance of England. The stubborn 
persistence of this unruly band would eventually 
contribute much to the success of the revolt. For the 
present time, however, it roamed the channel, plundering 
ships and coastal towns indiscriminately, its major 
contribution being in the form of booty to bolster 
William's treasury.32 
William and Louis, meanwhile, encouraged by the 
signs of resistance to Alva's tax, turned their attention 
to recruiting outside aid. Although William never 
altogether relinquished his hope of getting help from the 
German Protestant States, their efforts now focused on 
England and France. 
The arrival of Alva in the Netherlands with the 
main Spanish army was alarming to both France and 
England. Elizabeth had been frightened by Spanish 
involvement in the Northern Rebellion and their new 
ambassador, de Spes, did little to calm her fears. 33 
Elizabeth's council had begun to urge English 
intervention in the Netherlands. 34 The outbreak of 
religious war in France made French interference impossible 
and augmented the pressure on England. 
31 Acts of the Privy Council, Vol VIII, p. viii. 
32 Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 116. 
33 de Spes was advising Spain to pursue an aggressive 
anti-English policy including seizure of ships and goods. 
34 Wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation and Price 
Revolution, p. 232. 
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After the Peace of St. Germaine in August 1570, 
however, the Huguenot party, led by Coligny, was increasing 
in favour at the French court. It was at this stage that 
a scheme for joint Anglo-French action was first considered. 
The plan called for an alliance of France, German 
Protestants, and England, together with the Dutch rebels, 
against Spain. Having driven the Spaniards out, the 
Netherlands would be apportioned among the participants. 
Flanders and Artois would go to France, Holland and 
Zeeland to England, and Brabant, Guelders and Luxemburg 
35 to become German States ruled by William of Orange. 
Although the French council approved of the idea 
it advised Charles to be sure of English and French 
co-operation before taking any action. Elizabeth, as 
always, remained cautious, declining to commit herself 
to an invasion with a partner whose goodwill was 
normally suspect. In spite of the fact that Walsingham 
was negotiating to bring about a defensive alliance 
and relations between England and France were ostensibly 
friendly, Elizabeth could not ignore the unsettled 
domestic state of France. Even when Huguenot influence 
was ascendant. encouraging policies pleasing to England, 
there was always the realization that the Guises lurked 
in the background. With the Northern Rebellion and 
Ridolfi Plot fresh in their memories, few Englishmen 
could doubt what policy would be pursued should the 
35 Read, Burghley, p. 59. 
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domestic pendulum of France swing once mor.e. 
Elizabeth was not inclined to support France in 
her suspected ambition of gaining a foothold as a 
preliminary to taking over the Netherlands. She 
therefore gave only evasive answers to Charles IX and 
the invasion scheme foundered. Efforts to continue the 
revolt in the Netherlands reverted back to local forces. 
In February 1572, however, the reluctant Queen unwittingly 
precipitated its next phase. As part of a campaign being 
waged against channel piracy she warned de la Marek, 
captain of the Sea Beggars at that time sheltering in 
English ports, to make preparations to withdraw. On 
March 1 a proclamation was issued ordering "all 
freebooters of any nation to depart on penalty of 
confiscation and imprisonment. 1136 On leaving England 
the Sea Beggars proceeded to the Netherlands where they 
seized Brill and Flushing and raised the standard of 
revolt on dry land. 
It has been suggested that Elizabeth, despite 
her impending alliance with France was still not anxious 
for a complete rupture with Spain and was therefore 
37 
willing to expel the Spanish rebels from her ports. 
It was one of the paradoxes of Elizabethan foreign 
policy that such actions, while camouflaged with good 
intentions. often accomplished something other than their 
36 Ibid .• p. 72. 
37 C. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. X, p. xxix. 
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stated purpose, while leaving Elizabeth absolved from 
all blame. 
* * * 
The seizure of Brill and Flushing sparked 
another invasion of the Netherlands by William and his 
followers in mid-1572. This campaign relied heavily on 
aid from the Huguenots and fell victim with them to the 
St. Bartholomew's massacre in August. Coligny•s favour 
at the French court had come to depend on the success 
of his expedition to the Netherlands. Catherine de 
Medici distrusted his policy since she had no desire to 
tackle Spain alone. When the expedition met with disaster 
at Mons the fate of the French invasion was sealed 
. . 38 
along with that of its instigator. While France once 
more fell victim to religious strife William was left 
to continue the struggle against Spain. Despite continued 
negotiations with Catherine de Medici who showed some 
willingness to aid the rebels, France remained a 
shackled ally in the facQ of domestic disturbances. 
In England, France was still considered an 
unpredictable threat in spite of her fetters, and most 
of Elizabeth's involvement in the Netherlands was 
designed to undermine French influence. Only one month 
after France and England were joined in a defensive 
alliance under the Treaty of Blois a band of English 
38 Ibid., p. 153. 
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volunteers, under Sir Humphrey Gilbert, had been 
dispatched to the Netherlands. Their instructions 
clearly illustrate Elizabeth 1 s attitude. Anxious lest 
the Huguenot expedition prove too successful she told 
him to bring Englishmen in the Netherlands under stricter 
discipline and keep the French out of Flushing. 39 
If it appear that the Duke is not able to 
defend his master's countries from the French 
and that the French begin to possess any part 
of them, and especially the maritime parts, 
then it is like that the French, increasing 
their dominance, may be too potent neighbours 
for us and therefore (it) may be good for us 
to use all the means that may conveniently 
be, to stay that course.40 
Burghley's memorial written in June 1572 exemplifies 
England 1 s priorities. Despite pleas from Walsingham and 
others for open intervention Elizabeth's policy was 
evident. She did not object to English volunteers 41 
going over tn help the rebels but she would not risk 
open war with Spain. In her eyes it was imperative for 
England's safety that Spain be maintained as a counter-
poise to France. She hoped that the Netherlands would 
manage to regain their ancient liberties alone, but if 
aid became essential, and France looked too successful, 
she would help Philip defend his inheritance. 42 
39 Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 321. 
40 Read, Burghley, p. 74. 
41 The French ambassador estimated that there were 
from four to five thousand English volunteers in the 
Netherlands in May 1572. 
42 Wernham. Before the Armada, p. 320. 
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The St. Bartholomew's Massacre confirmed Elizabeth's 
worst fears about France and almost immediately she began 
to pave the way for a reconciliation with Spain. The 
Treaty of Blois had made provision for the transfer of 
the English cloth trade, which had been disrupted since 
Elizabeth's seizure of the Spanish loan, to France. 
The idea was never very popular with English merchants 
who felt that French instability precluded any permanent 
d . 43 tra e relations. In June 1572, therefore, when Alva 
suggested negotiations to settle differences, Elizabeth 
was receptive, and the next few years showed a marked 
improvement in Anglo-Spanish friendship. 
A preliminary accord was reached in March 1573 
when the Convention of Nymwegen re-established commercial 
relations between England and the Spanish Netherlands. 
Further negotiations culminated in the Convention of 
Bristol the following year. These agreements settled 
accounts about the seizures and counter-seizures of 
1568-1569 and led to promises that neither party would 
harbour rebels against the other. They also advocated 
. . . . . h 1 44 stricter measures against privateering in t e channe . 
Trade, no sooner restored with Spain, was disrupted 
again, this time by the Dutch. With the aid of the 
Sea Beggars and taking advantage of mutinies in the 
43 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 193. 
44 Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 327. 
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Spanish army, William had been able to consolidate his 
position in the north sustaining the revolt in Holland 
and Zeeland from whence he controlled traffic to and 
from Antwerp. Frustrated by Elizabeth's refusal to help 
his cause he began to restrict English shipping. 
Negotiations with the Merchant Adventurers led to 
continued trade in return for a war loan to William, 
but Elizabeth was infuriated and ordered seizure of 
45 Dutch ships in England. Thus angered by the rebels, 
Elizabeth now confined her official policy to efforts 
at mediation between Philip and his subjects. In 1574, 
therefore. when events in France once more entered into 
consideration, Elizabeth was on friendly terms with 
Spain but almost in a state of war with the Dutch. 
In May Charles IX died and Henry III became King 
of France. Eli2abeth suspected that this would lead 
to promotion of the Guises and she took care to maintain 
contacts with the opposition forces. The situation in 
France offered new opportunities to Elizabeth and her 
pol i c i es a t ·,th i s s tag e fores had ow those to be ·u s e d i n 
the Netherlands for some years to come. 
At the death of Charles IX and accession of his 
brother Henry, Francis, Duke of Alenlon became heir 
46 presumptive to the French throne. Fearing Alenion's 
45 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 330. 
46 At this time Francis also received the title 
of Duke of Anjou, however he will continue to be 
referred to as Alen5on for the remainder of this paper. 
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close ties with the Huguenots, Catherine de Medici 
kept him virtually a prisoner at the French court. 
47 
Henry's unfriendly attitude, meanwhile, emphasized 
the Guise threat and Elizabeth began to explore various 
means to foster the discontent in France. While toying 
with the idea of freeing Alen~on to join the Huguenots, 
she was also negotiating with Count Palatine to raise 
money in Germany for their cause. 
Catherine de Medici saw the Netherlands as a 
useful outlet for the militant activities of the 
48 Huguenots. When Alen~on escaped in September 1575 
this prospect became even more attractive offering the 
possibility of removing the King's troublesome brother 
by establishing him as their protector following 
William's suggestion. Since this policy would undoubtedly 
worsen her relations with Spain, Catherine was reluctant 
to allow a breach with England to develop. The Treaty of 
Blois was therefore renewed re-establishing Anglo-French 
cordiality on the surface. 49 
Elizabeth was not averse to a show of French 
friendship. Alva had been replaced in 1573 by a new 
governor in the Netherlands, Don Luis de Requesens. 
47 English merchants were hampered in France, and 
the question of Mary Stuart was reopened by the French 
ambassador in London. This normally indicated that Anglo-
french relations were somewhat strained. 
48 
Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 150. 
49 Read, Burghley, p. 154. 
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At last Spain appeared to be making progress. Requesens 
lifted the hated taxes and abolished the Council of Blood 
thus managing to undermine William 1 s efforts to win 
support from within the Netherlands. In the spring of 
1575 he opened negotiations with Holland and Zeeland 
50 
while making one last desperate effort to crush the revolt. 
His success apparently assured, Philip was no longer 
interested in Elizabeth 1 s offers of mediation and her 
envoy, Henry Cobham, who had been sent to Spain for 
this purpose, returned in January 1576 complaining of 
a cool reception. 51 If Elizabeth were to force Requesens 
into accepting her offer, she would have to make a show 
of Anglo-French solidarity. 
William, meanwhile, was desperately trying to 
persuade one or other of these possible allies to come 
to his aid, but by now he was convinced that he could 
hope for more from France than from England. Negotiations 
had been carried on somewhat erratically with Alen~on 
ever since 1573. 52 Robert Beale, who was sent to 
discuss the trade dispute with the Netherlands in 1576, 
reported that William had turned toward France and paid 
53 no account to England. Elizabeth warned William that 
50 Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, p. 141. 
51 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 315. 
52The Wars of Religion, Vol. III of The Cambridge 
Modern History, ed. by A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, and 
Stanley Leathes (London: MacMillan Company, 1909), p. 22. 
53Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 329. 
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she would side with Spain if he persisted in his pro-
French course. At the same time, however, she managed 
to confuse an envoy from Requesens enough to convince 
him that she would aid the rebels if Philip refused to 
54 
come to terms with them. All along Elizabeth was 
actually investigating a third possibility. Realizing 
that Henry III was in no rush to launch an invasion 
into the Netherlands led by his intractable younger 
brother3 Elizabeth began to see Alen5on as a possible 
f h 1 . . 55 Th ld t h" escape rom er perp ex1t1es. e o cour s 1p 
which had been shelved for a while was revived and in 
February 1576 Thomas Randolph was dispatched to France. 
His mission was two-fold: to convince Henry that any 
project of his against the Netherlands would force her 
to ally with Philip; and to tell Alen~on that she 
might lend him aid if he proceeded, under Elizabeth's 
56 guidance, against Spain in the Netherlands. Although 
this mission came to nothing, it showed clearly the 
course which Elizabeth's future policy was to follow. 
Events in the Netherlands forestalled any 
immediate action. In March Requesens died leaving an 
unpaid and mutinous Spanish army roaming the countryside 
and terrorizing the people of the Netherlands. Where 
a truce with Spain had previously seemed possible, 
54 Ibid., p. 320. 
55 Neale, Queen Elizabeth I ' p. 244. 
56 Read, Walsingham, Vo 1 . I ' p. 295. 
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the provinces now looked toward Holland and Zeeland 
for leadership, and negotiations were opened to bring 
b . 57 a out a un1on. In the face of disagreements from 
both sides the "Spanish Fury" at Antwerp served to 
convince the delegates who decided to pool their 
resources to expel the rapacious troops. 58 In 
November the Pacification of Ghent was signed uniting 
Holland and Zeeland with the other provinces. Thus when 
the new governor, Don John, arrived, he was confronted 
with an entirely new situation. 
* * * 
The apparent unity which faced Don John as he 
approached the Netherlands was not as solid as it 
seemed. The Pacification had been hastily formed in 
the face of a common danger, and the only definite 
policy to which the union was committed was expulsion of 
59 
the Spanish troops. Peace was establisb~d b~tw~~n 
- . .. . . .... - ~. .. ~ ·- - -
Holland and Zeeland and the other provinces and William 
was restored to the Stadholderships he had occupied 
prior to Alva's arrival, but disputed matters were to 
be referred to an assembly of the Estates of all the 
provinces. 60 Many points, therefore, were left unresolved, 
57 Wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation, p. 103. 
58wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 166. 
59 wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation and Price 
Revolution, p. 103. 
60 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 337. 
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notably the question of religion. 
Although the Pacification continued to acknowledge 
Philip as sovereign, it refused to admit Don John 
unless confirmed by him. Arriving with neither troops 
nor money Don John had little choice but to negotiate. 61 
In February 1577, in the Perpetual Edict, he ratified 
the Pacification and promised to dismiss the Spanish 
troops. The States General. however, in accepting this 
agreement, omitted to refer it to William. Since it 
included a clause to maintain Catholicism in the 
Netherlands it was evident that he could not acquiesce. 
The very fact that the States were even in a position 
to bargain with Don John was due largely to the Calvinists 
whose tenacity in Holland and Zeeland had enabled William 
to succeed there. It was impossible for him to accept a 
settlement that did not guarantee their faith. The 
religious issue would continue to plague the Netherlands 
until their ultimate division in 1579 into the Unions 
of Arras and Utrecht, but for the moment a facade of 
conciliation was maintained in the face of renewed 
hostility. 
While the nobles wrangled over the Perpetual 
Edict Don John, impatient at the obstruction of his 
62 greater purpose, amassed the remains of the Spanish 
61 . 
Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, p. 150. 
62 
Below p. 94. 
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army and seized Namur. 63 By his action he hoped to 
lure away William's shaky Catholic support but the 
effect was the opposite. Instead it greatly increased 
William's credibility and enhanced his popular following 
while the disparaged Catholic nobles were plunged 
into confusion. 
Faced once more with the prospect of war with 
Spain William, struggling to keep his forces together 
at home, embarked again on his quest for foreign aid. 
In seeking a protector for the Netherlands two possible 
candidates were being considered. William was still 
convinced that France offered the greatest hope and 
negotiations were reopened with Alen~on. This policy, 
however, was unpopular in the Netherlands where it was 
commonly suspected that France had greater ambitions 
and that the Guises were intriguing with Don John who 
had retreated to Luxemburg. 64 The Catholic party in 
the States, now known as the Malcontents and led by 
Aerschot, entered instead into an agreement with 
Matthias, the brother of the Emperor. 65 
Matthias was declared Governor of the Netherlands 
in December 1577. The agreement placed the main authority 
of the government in a council to be chosen by the States 
63c. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. XII, p. 36. 
64
wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 185. 
65 c. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. XII, p. xvi. 
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and was designed to diminish William's influence. 66 
Dissention continued, however, and he was able to 
circumvent their aims by reducing Matthias to a mere 
figurehead who yielded to William's guidance in all 
67 
matters. 
Philip, meanwhile, regarding the appointment of 
Matthias as an act of rebellion, sent the Spanish army 
back to the Netherlands under Alexander Farnese, Prince 
of Parma. 68 Matthias's arrival coincided with a severe 
defeat of the Netherlands forces at Gembloux as Don 
John began a systematic reconquest of the rebellious 
provinces. 
William's hope that Matthias would bring aid from 
his brother, Emperor Rudolph, proved false, and the 
States, now in a desperate position, were persuaded 
69 
to treat once more with Alen~on. The terms of the 
agreement reached in August 1578 illustrated the deep 
distrust that was still felt towards him. He was 
accepted only as an ally with no share in the government 
and no guarantees of sovereignty. He could conquer lands 
east of the Meuse where his campaign against Spain was 
66 Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 181. 
67 Ibid., p. 186. 
68 Wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 331-332. 
69 
Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 386. 
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to be confined. 70 To further emphasize the suspicion, 
yet another possible protector was being considered. 
The Calvinists, who were especially powerful at Ghent, 
had been intriguing with Duke John Casimir as an 
alternative to Alen5on. 71 By October, when Don John 
died and was succeeded by Parma, a state of civil war 
existed among the rebels. 
The problem of religion which had complicated the 
revolt from the beginning, now surfaced and irreparably 
altered the character of the rebellion. The Netherlands 
as a whole was still predominantly Catholic but 
Calvinism was strong in the north and powerful among 
72 
the working class in the south especially in the cities. 
Although William had tried valiantly to nullify the 
religious issue and keep the dispute within the realm 
of politics, he had been forced to rely more and more 
on the Calvinists and his idea of liberty of conscience 
for all was far ahead of its time. Efforts to reach a 
religious peace were sabotaged on both sides and by the 
beginning of 1579 the provinces were divided into the 
73 Catholic and Protestant Unions of Arras and Utrecht. 
With the reconciliation of the former with Philip and 
70 
Ibid., p. 400. 
71 Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 10. 
72 Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 127. 
73 
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Parma in June the revolt was henceforth confined to 
the northern provinces. In 1581 they renounced their 
allegiance in the Act of Abjuration. 74 The rebellion was 
now definitely anti-Catholic. 
* * * 
Don John's arrival in the Netherlands in 1576 
was to have been prefatory to a much more ambitious 
project known as the "Enterprise of England. 11 His plan, 
having pacified the Netherlands, was to invade England 
and release and marry Mary Stuart so that they might 
75 
restore Catholicism there together. It was in 
Elizabeth's interests, therefore, that the Netherlands 
should not be too easily subdued. She was well aware 
of his schemes and began to feel that her involvement 
might be essential, but the divisions among the rebel 
leaders made it difficult for her to decide exactly 
where to lend her support. 
She was uncertain as to the extent of Alen5on 1 s 
support in France and her first instinct was to warn 
Don John that therein lay his greatest danger. Advising 
him to make peace with the States she stressed that she 
would tolerate neither Spanish oppression nor French 
76 involvement in the Netherlands. She assured him of 
74 
Koenigsberger and Moss, Europe in the Sixteenth 
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76 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 344. 
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her goodwill toward Philip but explained that she 
could not ignore affairs of the channel seaboard 
especially if it appeared that France might triumph 
77 through her apathy. 
With the Perpetual Edict concluded and in the 
expectation of peace in France Elizabeth became more 
receptive to pleas for aid from William and the States. 
A loan had been sent in December 1576 and more had been 
promised 78 but the squabbling States seemed a poor 
investment to a parsimonious Queen and she preferred 
to subsidize Casimir's exploits as an alternative to 
79 Alenson. It seemed that she was already too late, 
however, for Alenson was already involved in 
negotiations with the States which would culminate in 
the treaty of August 1578, naming him defender of their 
liberties. 
Always able to see an alternative when faced 
with apparent calamity, Elizabeth was not at a loss. 
She had been assured by Alenson that he was entirely 
at her disposal in the Netherlands. In May 1578 she 
therefore dispatched Cobham to France to renew the 
marriage negotiations. In June, he and Walsingham 
proceeded on an embassy to the Netherlands. 80 
77 
Elton, 
78 Read, 
79 
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The Alen3on marriage negotiations and Walsingham-
Cobham embassy are two episodes which serve to demonstrate 
the vacillations of Elizabethan foreign policy which 
caused such exasperation to her councillors and 
frustrated her friends and enemies alike. Yet in the 
end Elizabeth usually accomplished her purpose. 
Elizabeth never revealed her very considerable 
diplomatic talents to greater advantage than 
in her most amorous discourses .... in that 
very form of diplomacy in which she was most 
at home, not only her neighbours, but even her 
intimate and trusted advisers were most at sea. 81 
Whether Elizabeth was ever serious about marriage 
is still a matter of conjecture. It obviously was to 
her councillors, too, as Walsingham observes: 
I do conceive that it was really intended by 
the FRENCH, and by the chief of the ENGLISH 
Councel, except Leicester ... but for her own 
Mind, what that really was, I must leave, as 
a thing doubly inscr~~able, both as she was 
a Woman and a Queen. 
The negotiations for the Alenjon marriage, which had 
originated when Walsingham was trying to bring about 
the Treaty of Blois, were still going on a decade 
later when he was again in Paris attempting to conclude 
another league. Hampered by vague and often contradictory 
instructions and constant fluctuations in his mistress's 
apparent policy, he complained: 
81 Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 4. 
82Sir Dudley Digges, Knight, The Compleat 
Ambassador: or Two Treaties of the Intended Marriage 
of u: Elizabeth of Glorious Memor (London: Tho: 
Newcomb, 1655 , preface. 
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... when her Majesty is pressed to marry, thus 
she seemeth to affect a league, and when a league 
is yielded to, then she liketh better of a 
marriage. And when thereupon she is moved to 
assent to marriage, then hath she recourse to 
the league; when the motion for the league, or 
any request is made for money, then her Majesty 
returneth to the marriage.BJ 
Elizabeth's policy between 1578 - 1584 is 
confusing in retrospect and must have driven those 
expected to give advice and carry it out to near 
distraction. Certain clearly defined threads do emerge, 
however, through the intricate warp and weft of its 
fabric. 
As always, the consideration which took precedence 
over all others was to avoid French annexation of the 
Netherlands. Thus we see Walsingham and Cobham, at the 
outset of their mission, instructed to find out what 
the French were planning and use personal persuasion 
to stop their schemes. 84 In an effort to discredit 
Alen5on, of whose fidelity Elizabeth was never quite 
certain, they were to warn the States to limit the 
force he was to bring and make sure he would not be 
powerful enough to rule them. 85 
As Alen5on 1 s agreement with the States in 1578 
became an accomplished fact, and as she grew more 
certain that he acted without the backing of the 
83 
C. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. XV, p. xxvi. 
84 Ibid., Vol. XIII, pp. 11-13. 
85 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 382. 
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French crown, Elizabeth became more and more convinced 
that through the marriage negotiations she might 
influence him to become her instrument in the Netherlands. 
Pleas from her ambassadors to aid the States before the 
French moved in now brought forth rebukes from their 
mistress, 86 1eaving Walsingham and Cobham bewildered 
while Elizabeth resorted to her favourite game of 
courtship. 
By 1580 Elizabeth's policy toward France had 
shifted slightly. Faced with the increasing power of 
Spain after Philip's acquisition of Portugal, she 
appeared now to favour joint Anglo-French intervention 
in the Netherlands and Walsingham was again dispatched 
to France to seek an alliance. 87 At this stage it 
would seem that she was trying to create a picture 
of Anglo-French solidarity in order to prevent any 
action against herself from Philip. Elizab~th was now 
prepared to countenance and even elicit Henry Ill's 
88 
support of his brother in the Netherlands. This 
prospect had been dreaded by her two years earlier. 
Although dual involvement was advocated, it was suspected 
by those who had been dealing with Elizabeth for many 
years, that she would not be averse to emphasizing 
86 
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87 Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 361. 
88 
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Alenfon's role as being French and thus precipitate 
a war between her two rivals. Catherine de Medici much 
preferred to marry Alen~on to Elizabeth, thus transferring 
him and the responsibility for his escapades to 
England. 89 Unable, therefore, to outwit the French 
Elizabeth resigned herself to subsidizing Alen~on enough 
to make him a nuisance to Philip but not to ensure his 
b . h . . h s . 90 success or ring er into war wit pain. 
Since the idea of French annexation of the 
Netherlands was so abhorrent to Elizabeth it appears 
that she would, as a last resort, have helped Philip 
regain control had this seemed inevitable. She 
preferred, however, a retention of Spanish sovereignty 
limited by recognition of the ancient privileges of 
the Netherlands. Thus Walsingham and Cobham were to 
urge Don John to accept the terms of the Pacification 
f Gh t h . h t d th . h 91 o en w ic guaran ee ese rig ts. 
Eager to remain on good terms with Philip, 
Elizabeth was careful to disguise her involvement in 
the Netherlands as an effort to help protect his 
inheritance from France. 92 At the same time, however, 
89 Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 244. 
90 Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 3. 
91 C. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. XIII, p. 151. 
92 
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she did not hesitate to show fresh ardour in the 
marriage negotiations and threaten alliance with France 
if Philip appeared to be contemplating involvement in 
any of the numerous anti-English activities being 
instigated by the Guises and the Pope. 93 She also 
threatened to side with the States if Don John proved 
unreasonable or sought aid from the Guises. 94 
In attempting to unravel this web of perplexity, 
Walsingham and Cobham had additional problems with 
which to contend. It was established from past 
experience that Elizabeth hated helping rebels and 
the Dutch were particularly loathsome to her. Their 
incessant bickering annoyed her and she de~pised being 
heralded as the Protestant champion of a Calvinist mob. 
Annoyed over William's trade embargo and his determination 
to seek aid in France she was irascible when confronted 
with pleas for funds. 95 She also saw no reason why she 
should lend money without excellent guarantees for 
repayment, when she considered the Netherlands well 
able to finance a much greater portion of their own 
96 
revolt. 
The attitude of the French throughout this 
93 Read, Burghley, p. 229. 
94 wernham, Before the Armada, p. 330. 
95 Read, Burghley, p. 201. 
96 
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..period is fairly straightforward. Plagued with 
domestic unrest in which Alen~on was taking part, they 
were eager to get rid of him by encouraging his involvement 
in the Netherlands. They wanted him married to Elizabeth 
so that responsibility for his anti-Spanish activities 
97 
would be transferred to her. They were not keen for 
his campaign to be too successful since this might 
enhance the position of the Huguenots in FrancP. 98 and 
they determined not to aid him openly for fear of war 
with Spain. 
But what of Alen5on? For six years he had 
become the shuttle which would weave this fabric on 
the loom of European politics. Whose was the controlling 
hand and whose the grand design? 
Elizabeth, despite her very considerable ability 
to shape events, was never entirely certain that she 
had control. Although Alen5on had assured her that he 
was entirely at her devotion, she always suspected that 
he, too, was using the marriage negotiations to further 
his own aims. Walsingham was instructed to find out 
"the very secret of his mind and disposition in these 
affairs. 1199 
As usual, her suspicions were correct. What 
97 
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99 
Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 395. 
102 
Alen3on lacked in ability was more than compensated 
by his very considerable personal ambition. It was 
obvious that he intended to be no-one's tool in the 
100 N~therlands. As their plight became more desperate 
he pressed for more concessions from the rebels. 
Negotiating first with the States and later with 
William after 1579, by the Treaty of Plessis le Tours 
signed in September 1580 he was finally recognized as 
sovereign, albeit with certain restrictions against 
l 0 l his absolute power. 
Realizing that the prospect of his marrying 
Elizabeth would greatly enhance his position, he was 
prepared to play her game. At the same time, however, 
he was bargaining with his brother to try to obtain 
the financial support necessary for a successful campaign. 
Offering his services to end the latest of France's 
interminable religious wars, he managed to extract 
a promise of aid from Henry for his Netherlands 
. 102 
ventures in return. 
Alenson was not above plotting with Parma and 
even Ph .,. 103 l ip and when all else failed he launched an 
abortive coup against the States in an effort to gain 
lOOR d ea , Walsingham, Vol . I I , p . 107. 
l 0 l Wedgwood, William the Silent, p . 215. 
102R d ea , Walsingham, Vol . I I , p . 44. 
103 Wedgwood, William the Silent~ p . 240. 
103 
control of the major cities as a preliminary to taking 
l 04 
over the whole country. The "Folly of Antwerp" in 
January 1583 sealed his fate in the Netherlands and he 
retired to France where he died the following year. 
With the assassination of William of Orange on July 10th 
1584 Elizabeth's policy of fighting Philip by proxy in 
the Netherlands came to an end. She must now commit 
herself or be faced with "the triumphant power of Spain. 11105 
104R d ea , Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 107. 
105 
Ibid., p. 117. 
CONCLUSION 
HER HAND FIRM AND STRONG. 
It was a strange circumstance that by pursuing 
policies basically designed to obstruct France, Elizabeth 
would ultimately find herself at war with Spain. After 
twenty years of peace she was finally forced, in 
December 1585, to dispatch an expedition under Leicester 
to the Netherlands. Despite the failure of this expedition 
open hostility between Spain and England was now an 
established fact and it would intensify until its 
culmination in the Spanish Armada of 1588-
With the death of Alen~on in 1584 a new chapter 
had opened in A~glo-French relations. As long as Henry III 
remained childless, which seemed likely, Henry of 
Navarre was now heir to the throne. 1 The prospect of 
a Huguenot succession was unacceptable to the Guise 
faction who set about trying to establish a Catholic 
succession instead. 2 They were supported in this effort 
by Philip who was afraid that Henry might accept an 
offer of sovereignty from the Netherlands. Philip and 
the Guises entered into the secret Treaty of Joinville 
1Appendix B. 
2 Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 368. 
104 
105 
in December 1584 which aimed to prevent the Navarre 
. 3 
succession. 
Many of the points at issue between England and 
France had by now lost their significance. Scotland was 
committed to the English alliance, Mary Stuart had 
turned to Spain and ceased to be of interest to the 
French crown, 4 and in refusing their offer of sovereignty 
in February 1585, Henry no longer presented a threat 
in the Netherlands. As France plunged into a war over 
the succession in which Philip was deeply involved, it 
became obvious that Spain was now the one to be feared. 
If he and the Guises were successful in France Philip 
would achieve Spanish domination of Europe which 
would seriously threaten England. 
The acquisition of Portugal in 1581 had resulted 
5 in an alarming increase of Spanish strength. Attempts 
to engineer joint Anglo-French aid for Don Antonio had 
never materialized and the addition of the Portuguese 
navy to the Spanish fleet made Philip's strength most 
formidable. A pro-Spanish succession in France would have 
cemented his control on the continent and enabled Parma, 
now showing increasing success in the Netherlands, to 
3J. H. Elliott, Europe Divided: 1559 - 1598 
(Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 308. 
4 
Read, The Tudors, p. 181. 
5 Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 356. 
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6 invade England. The combined Spanish - Gui~e~des~gns 
for plots against Elizabeth were well known and she could 
no longer rely on unofficial interference to prevent 
disaster. 
In August 1585, therefore, by the Treaty of 
Nonsuch, Elizabeth took the Dutch under her protection. 
England's years of peace thus came to an end. It was 
fortunate that Elizabeth's preparation for this day had 
been thorough. She had secured her postern gate by 
alliance with James which considerably reduced the 
threat of foreign invasion from Scotland. She had 
strengthened her forces and restored her economy and 
was no longer dependent upon foreign allies. She had 
nourished Hapsburg - Valois rivalry and neutralized 
the possibility of a Franco-Spanish crusade against 
England. Finally, by fostering discontent against both 
monarchs she had thwarted their individual designs 
against her. 
As political. economic and ideological differences 
finally merged into one general struggle between Spain 
7 
and England it was certain that Elizabeth had indeed 
shunned the rocks and shoals. She had achieved her 
independence, and guided the argosy of England to a 
new position of predominance on the waters of the world. 
6 Elliott, Europe Divided, pp. 310 - 311. 
7 
Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 167. 
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